Libya – thinking liberal

Accounting for Libya

So now we are in a sort of endgame in the Libyan war. It is not over, but Gaddafi’s government has been decisively beaten. This outcome arises despite a constant stream of scepticism amongst experts and commentators, right from the start, and from a broad political spectrum. I was not one of these sceptics, and I must admit to being annoyed by the patronising tone of much of it, assuming that politicians and supporters were muddled naifs who had failed to learn from history. While these sceptics rapidly move on to point out the considerable difficulties that will arise in rebuilding the country, I feel that some accounting is called for.

As I said at the time, Libya’s situation was unique. It’s geography is such as to make air power particularly effective. Gaddafi’s rampant egotism had made him diplomatically isolated, tolerated by his allies and not liked. In spite of claims by many that there was no clear strategy for the intervention, the strategy was clear all along. Use air power to protect the existing rebel strongholds and then strangle the Gaddafi regime. After this it would basically collapse from within. This was mainly about momentum and morale. Apart from a core of die-hard loyalists, who had much to lose from regime change, the regime’s power depended on two sources of support: loyal tribes and mercenary soldiers. These would only be effective as long they thought the regime was going to win.

And so it has transpired. The fall of Tripoli was remarkable. Yes the core loyalists fought hard, and they are still there – but there were not enough of them, and they seemed to lack organisation. The mercenaries had melted away into thin air. The sympathetic tribes just looked on. The turning point seems to have been the cutting off of the capital from succour coming in via the Tunisian and Algerian borders.

None of this is hindsight – seem my post last March. What annoys me about the many critics is their inability to look beyond the generalities to the specific facts of the case. To them, it was this way in Iraq, so it will be this way in Libya. I am afraid that this kind of unthinking generalisation is a general disease right across modern society, and especially amongst people counted as experts. From medicine to economic policy. People don’t bother to analyse the particulars of the case, simply spouting forth the general rules with confidence.

It is too much to hope this will change. But we fight on.

Libya: the UN motion is not just a cynical gesture

I’m getting a bit fed up with commentators who launch into diatribes based on generalities, without bothering to examine the facts of the case in point. Libya is the latest example. I have read two articles critical of the UN motion authorising military action; Max Hastings in the FT, and Sean Collins in Spiked. The situation in Libya is interesting because it is unique; these articles are almost worthless because they never get beyond generalities. In fact exceptional circumstances make the UN-approved action a viable way forward; and no doubt that is why it was proposed.

Mr Collins’s article is the weaker – but it is a pretty typical offering for a Spiked writer. (See my post on Spiked). Its title is Libya: how the West just made things worse. He says:

Far from rescuing the Libyan uprising, the resolution is a setback for the cause of democracy and self-determination.

He does not do a good job of explaining why though. We get the usual complaints that it will undermine the rebels’ legitimacy; we also get a rather old-fashioned (and unsupported) reference to the sacred principle of national sovereignty. He does not even attempt to explain how this is worse for the rebels than being overrun by Gaddafi’s forces, or at least how this would be better for self-determination and democracy. This comes over as just another rant from a writer who would condemn any action taken by a Western leader, whatever it was.

Mr Hastings’s article is much more disappointing, because he is a military historian who should be able to deploy some insight and expertise, if he could be bothered. His article is entitled US and its allies are too late to help Libya. His contention is that only intervention by ground forces will save the Libyan rebels:

…the situation today is where it always was: once Muammer Gaddafi showed himself determined to fight, only direct ground intervention by the US and its allies would have enabled the ill-armed rebels to prevail.

This would ordinarily be a correct assessment; but Libya is different. Libya consists of a series of settlements separated by expanses of desert. Crossing this desert is the key to success, and that gives air power a much greater effectiveness than normal. Ground forces must be motorised – but motor vehicles are vulnerable with so little cover. Or you use airpower – which, of course can be neutralised by opposing airpower. Added to which are the issues of logistics; advancing forces find it increasingly difficult to keep in fuel and ammunition the further they advance – and rely on motor or air transport for these too. This is not Kosovo or Bosnia. Gaddafi does not have huge forces at his disposal, so it is quite realistic for this intervention to halt them – although not to roll them back.

So it looks quite feasible for the West to sustain the rebel territory from Benghazi eastwards, especially given the moral boost that intervention gives them. This still leaves Gaddafi in control of most of the country. How is he to be defeated? He will be defeated once his forces start to lose hope. This is possible because he depends on two groups in particular: foreign mercenaries and tribal allies. Both of these need to be on the winning side; a third group, Gaddafi loyalists who face the prospect of being lynched if Gaddafi loses, are more reliable but not enough. Gaddafi’s problem is that the economy has collapsed: he needs those migrant workers and the oil trade. More rigorous enforcement of sanctions is part of the UN resolution.

Which leads me to another exceptional circumstance: Gaddafi is diplomatically isolated. The Arab League has come out against him, and he has no allies (apart from Syria perhaps and, who knows?, Iran). This is just reward for his antics and excessive ego; he was never a reliable ally. This puts him in the same situation as Saddam Hussein after his attack on Kuwait. This isolation gives the West a much greater degree of legitimacy, as well as making it much more difficult for him to rebuild a sustainable state from the territory he does hold.

So the scenario for victory is this. Gaddafi’s advances are halted and the resolve of the rebels sustained by the no-fly zone, and air strikes from Western powers and Arab states (with the US not necessarily playing a huge role). Gaddafi’s support then gradually melts away as his tribal allies are tempted to change sides in order to bring the conflict to an end, and mercenaries become unwilling to expose themselves to air attack and the possibility of the regime collapsing. This is not the only possible outcome – but it is viable. Unlike trying to shift the Serbs from Kosovo with air power alone.

What are the morals for dictators wishing to avoid overthrow? First keep the armed forces under your control (unlike Tunisia and Egypt). Second make sure you stay friends with enough of your neighbours (unlike Gaddafi and Saddam). All the worse for the incipient rebellions in Bahrain and Yemen. Also it helps if your country isn’t mostly desert. Robert Mugabe looks pretty safe.

What is going on in Libya?

The chaotic goings on in Libya expose the weaknesses in modern journalism. I am particularly disappointed in the BBC, whose radio news is one of my main sources. The modern journalists job, it seems, is to relay the latest dramatic report, and pass on the odd rumour. Analysis isn’t their job. And the biggest crime of all is to report news that is out of date, no matter that it may be more accurate than earlier reports. 24 hour news coverage simply tries to substitute quantity for quality. I can only stand it for short periods. The BBC was particularly weak in reporting what happened at the western oil town of Brega yesterday. This morning I found the best coverage in the Independent, though I have to say I didn’t do a thorough search. There was a reasonable overview in the FT as well (behind the paywall…). This matters because what is actually happening informs public policy decisions back here.

The situation appears to be quite chaotic. The Gaddafi forces clearly have strong grip on Tripoli. They have some reasonably well organised forces, with access to some heavier weapons, including some air power. They have control on some other towns too, including Sirte, Muammar Gaddafi’s home town, which is on the coast roughly halfway between Tripoli and the second city, and main rebel stronghold, of Benghazi. But we shouldn’t exaggerate their strength. Air attacks seem to be occasional sorties by single aircraft. In their attack on Brega they needed to use civilian cars. Mostly they seem unable to dislodge determined resistance from even lightly-armed irregulars. That is just as well, because the rebel forces lack organization and weapons. The regular army seems to have dissolved, and probably wasn’t up to much in the first place.

The Gaddafi forces seem to be consolidating. The main priority for them, apart from continuing to hold Tripoli, is to retake the towns to the west of Tripoli up to the Tunisian border. This seems to be slow going. The attack on Brega was interesting because it is in the west of the country, not all that far from Benghazi. The rebels managed to get in reinforcements, and this seems to have held them. They may make another attempt today. Apparently they want to control the airfield, no doubt so that they can get reinforcements and supplies from Tripoli.

What this seems to boil down to is stalemate. Gaddafi is militarily too strong to dislodge what he holds, but too weak to extend his control very far. Never mind taking new ground, he probably hasn’t go enough loyal forces to hold much more than he already does. Meanwhile the economy has collapsed and Gaddafi is politically isolated. No doubt he has lots of weapons, fuel and ammunition in Tripoli – and cash to pay the mercenaries – but it is difficult to see how he can get reinforcements or replenishments. This means that things could get very ugly in Tripoli, as Gaddafi forces throw their weight around, commandeer food for themselves, and so on. They will only be defeated when their morale collapses.

So what are we to do? Military intervention would be very messy. NATO forces have the competence, but would be very messy politically – getting them out would be difficult as they would be left with the baby in hand. Arab or African forces would be less politically difficult, but I question their ability to avoid many civilian casualties. A no-fly zone looks a non-starter; it would take a lot of resources to implement, while not making all that much practical difference. Isolating Gaddafi will help, but what is needed is some way to break the spirit of his forces. I don’t know if there is a way to offer his mercenaries or other loyal forces an easy exit – but this could reduce their will to fight.

But in the end, we in the west need to accept that we do not rule the world, and nor should we. Events will have to take their own course; we can only limit the human suffering at the margins.

Update: 4 March 2011

As usual, some very good coverage in the Economist this week, as consensus settles on the situation being a military stalemate. The Economist points out that the real significance of the Gaddafi airpower is the ability it gives them to transfer their forces from place to place, and to attack groups of fighters crossing the desert between the main towns. I think they are exaggerating Gaddafi’s airpower somewhat. Air forces (and especially combat aircraft) are notoriously difficult to keep in airworthy condition. The regime may not have the capability to fly more than a few of their aircraft at a time, without external help. His diplomatic isolation is critical here.