It was a dull election campaign but an earthquake of a result – not less significant for it having been widely predicted. Above all it shows just how much the country’s electoral system dictates its politics. That is how Labour won, and that is how they will stay in power.
I resisted the temptation to update my electoral predictions last week, as I didn’t have much more to add. If I had I would have talked up the Greens a bit, and also predicted that Jeremy Corbyn would win his seat of Islington North – notwithstanding a very dodgy local poll saying that he was well behind. I sensed that as people became more assured of a substantial Labour victory, with even the Tories saying so, that left-leaning voters, unenthused by the party’s relentless centrism, would vote for alternatives. The Tory tack of talking up Labour, referred to as the “Queensland Strategy”, to try and persuade people to vote Conservative to provide an opposition to Labour, was laughable. The Tories showed much more interest in fighting each other than opposing Labour.
The results proved me broadly correct, including those late predictions I didn’t publish – though I was surprised about how well the pro-Gaza independents did, unseating the prominent Labour front-bencher Jonathan Ashworth, for example, and nearly doing so to Labour big-hitter Wes Streeting. There were two main surprises for me though. The first was just how low was the overall share of the vote that Labour eventually got (about 35%) – much lower than the polling predictions, and with a much lower lead over the Conservatives (10% compared to a consistent 20%, though this dropped a bit in the last polls). This did not have much impact on the result in seats, though; a lot of this dynamic was happening in safe Labour seats, with Labour supporters moving to Greens and Independents, or not showing up to vote. The other surprise was quite how many seats the Liberal Democrats won. My argument had been that weakness on the ground would place an upper limit on the party’s performance of about 50 seats; in the event they won 72 – and nearly won a slew of others. There is an upper bound to Lib Dem performance – but it’s quite a bit higher than I thought it was. In about half the seats the Lib Dems won, pre-election campaigning was weak – but there was enough local council strength for the party to make the case for tactical votes, and there must also have been a bit of help from the national campaign, which managed to increase support for the party overall, over the course of the campaign (though it ended up in vote share more or less where it was in 2019).
Interestingly, the MRP polls, a big feature of this campaign, did not come off as badly as the ordinary ones, though they made similar mistakes with the overall vote shares for Labour and the Conservatives. The Labour victory was at the lower end of the range of these projections, but at least it was within it. They picked up more of a sense of how efficient the Labour and Lib Dem polling was in electoral terms, and inefficient was that for Reform UK and the Greens. They didn’t see the rise of the independents, and the projections for individual seats were often wayward, especially for the distribution of votes between the parties. As I suggested in my comments during the campaign, they exaggerated Labour strength in Lib Dem targets – allowing many a Labour leaflet to suggest that the party was in contention when it was in fact a distant third.
So the Labour victory was big but shallow, with many close results. Indeed, supporters of the previous leader, Jeremy Corbyn, noted that the party won fewer votes than when their man was leading – making the narrative of why Sir Keir Starmer’s stewardship proved so successful much more complicated than the mainstream explanation suggests. Labour did not win, so much as the Tories lost. Sir Keir Starmer did not win over many people to his party (and he lost a good few), but he did not scare as many Tory voters as his predecessor – allowing them to stay at home or vote for Reform.
To be fair on Sir Keir, he seems to understand the thinness of his mandate. He is not using the scale of his victory to suggest that he has public support for radical policies. He is trying to establish a reputation for competence – something the Conservatives lost in the wake of the Brexit referendum. Labour will, of course, relentlessly blame the country’s “14 years of Tory chaos” – never mind that these followed three years of Labour chaos, and that the first six years were not especially chaotic. But whether it was 8 years of chaos or 14 makes no real difference to voters. This is a sensible strategy. The populist right plan a relentless attack on Labour for being “woke” – attending to the “luxury beliefs” of liberals and the identity politics of some ethnic minority politicians. Sir Keir’s best hope of winning the next election is to contrast the wildness of these attacks with the unfussy competence of reality. Good luck with that. He has the discouraging examples of Francois Hollande in France, and Gerhard Schroder in Germany. Two uncharismatic but competent left-of-centre politicians who were/are unable to manage the stresses of modern politics. Still, those leaders were operating in a very different political systems. So long as Labour can keep the right divided, its chances are good.
On the question of the right, I continue to follow the writings of populist promoter Matt Goodwin. I like him because he is reasonably factual, unlike many of his fellow travellers, who trade in conspiracy theories and lies. He did not have a particularly good election. He was elated by the Reform surge after its leader, Nigel Farage, started to seriously engage in the campaign. He went on to breathlessly call an inflection point, with Reform surpassing the Conservatives, backed up his own polling organisation, which proved by some margin to be the least accurate of all those publishing polls. But then Reform flatlined, and Mr Goodwin started to talk about the French elections instead. Looking back on the election, he is now calling the Reform glass half full. It has indeed peeled off the working class/lower middle class part of the Tory 2019 coalition, but it is making little progress beyond that. The Conservatives outpolled them by 10% – and its much stronger ground organisation showed. A pile of second places is no use in the British electoral system – and you need a strong ground operation to turn those second places into wins – just ask the Liberal Democrats. Complaining about the electoral system doesn’t cut it. The chances of Reform doing that on their own in more than a handful of places looks thin.
That leaves a stalemate on the right. Clearly it needs to rebuild the 2019 coalition, across working class and middle class voters, and in the north, south, east and west of England and Wales. Reform can’t do that. The Conservatives have two strategies open to them: the first is to displace Reform from the ground they now hold, and then rope in the middle classes and professionals later. But that will be hard: they have lost trust, and now that Mr Farage is in parliament he is in a strong position to fight them off – unless they can find a way of bringing him on board. The other strategy is to regain the middle ground, and then attack and squeeze Reform nearer to the next election, rather as David Cameron successfully did in 2015 to Ukip, a Reform forerunner. But Tory grassroots seem to have little patience for such a strategy, and they need somebody to lead it who is untainted by the Johnson, Truss and Sunak regimes – their own Keir Starmer. The likelihood is that the party will tear itself apart while trying to decide. This is Labour’s best hope, as they inevitably get bogged down in the mid-term.
What of the Lib Dems? Their large slew of MPs will give them more money, and more clout in parliament. It is a very different party from the ill-disciplined and eclectic group of local activists of the early 2000s, who often opposed Labour from the left. The centre is much stronger – this year’s campaign was notable for the strength of its central campaign, and consistency of its message across the country. They will seek to consolidate their gains, and build up new prospects. Their campaigning will continue with the same voter-led messages (health, care and the environment). But there is a hunger within the party for something more idealistic, defining what the party is all about. There will also be pressure to ramp up messaging around Europe. Perhaps they are shaping up to be part of a coalition with Labour in 2028/29.
But the big message of this campaign, demonstrated by both Labour and the Lib Dems, and in reverse by Reform and the Greens, is that elections are won by constituency-led targeting. The electoral system is shaping politics as completely as ever. Will electoral reform come back onto the political agenda? There are three broad options. The first is the Alternative Vote, which is not much more than a tweak to the existing system, but one which would allow those disenfranchised Reform and Green voters (to say nothing of third-placed Conservatives and Labour ones) more of a say. This would suit the Conservatives best – the Australian experience is that such a system ultimately reinforces the power to the two main established parties. And yet they united in opposing exactly this system when it was put to a referendum in 2011. The more radical alternative is proportional representation, which would suit Reform and the Greens best. This would have Lib Dem support too, though it is unclear that the party would benefit much, and it also has the support of many Labour grassroots.
But such chatter is irrelevant. The Labour leadership is focused on its core “missions”, which do not include political reform – and turkeys don’t vote for Christmas. Until there is a public groundswell to change the system, as there was in New Zealand in the 1990s, there will be no serious move to change things. The British electorate is very conservative, as that 2011 referendum showed. And if such a groundswell was going to happen, I think it would have happened already. Reform and the Greens need to learn from the Lib Dems and embrace local politics.
Last week’s election provided some fascinating lessons in electoral science: divided voter bases are punished, local campaign infrastructure matters, voter abstention is a real option for many electors and social media has limits as to its impact. It is pleasing to see so many LibDems elected arising from a disciplined strategy – it was easy for messaging to be lost in the Tory/Labour/Reform scrum.
In one way the Lib Dem campaign was a radical one; it offered to tax more and spend more than either of the two main parties. Extra taxation was to be £27bn a year, and extra borrowing around £20bn a year a compared with the Labour figures of around £9bn and around £4bn respectively. This enabled them to make a credible offering on the electorate’s number one priority – health and social care. As I see it, the succeeded particularly in a certain type of traditionally conservative seat where many electors are relatively well off without being rich, where many people have enough comfortably live on despite the cost-of-living crisis, but they lack one thing in their day-to-day lives; that is an adequate supply of services provided by the public sector, be it the NHS, social care, police on the streets, roads without potholes or rivers without sewage. Hence the strength of the Lib Dems in places like the Cotswolds, Chichester, the ‘nice’ Oxfordshire countryside, Guildford – even Tunbridge Wells. The Conservative claim that taxes could be cut was not credible.
Yes – but the problem is that the Lib Dem embrace of higher taxes tried to avoid the critical taxes that directly affect working people and pensioners. I don’t think that is actually sustainable – though arguably that shouldn’t bother the party as it won’t be in government. But I do think the party needs to consider the real possibility of forming a coalition with Labour in five years time.
On the main point, I would agree that the many Labour close results places them in danger of incurring a hung Parliament next time round, particularly as – on the advice of the IFS – they have promised more than they can deliver without substantial tax rises. As you suggest, Matthew, in such a situation, some form of cooperation between Labour and Lib Dems would be necessary. But, in the light of their experience in 2010-2015, might not the Lib Dems want a looser form of collaboration than a full coalition, so as not to appear to contradict manifesto promises? More generally, I would expect them to continue to exploit a strength in areas of the country not scarred by the effects of the harsh 19th century industrialisation experience and the associated class-based polarisations.
Labour are clearly vulnerable next time, but a lot hangs on what happens in the Tory-Reform melee. Whether the Lib Dems will offer Labour a coalition or some lesser form of cooperation I think depends on how well the party does. If it goes backwards, I don’t think there will be much of a mood for coalition. But if the party manages to build on its momentum, scooping up Labour voters while the Tories fail to win back more moderate voters, then I think a coalition is a realistic option – but one where the party has much more heft than in 2010. And that surely must be the party’s strategic objective – a coalition where it is perceived to be the stronger partner is surely an intermediate step to becoming one of the country’s two main parties.
“Indeed, supporters of the previous leader, Jeremy Corbyn, noted that the party won fewer votes than when their man was leading – making the narrative of why Sir Keir Starmer’s stewardship proved so successful much more complicated than the mainstream explanation suggests.”
True but it’s not that complicated. The right wing vote was more or less united in 2017 and 2018. It was split last Thursday. In addition there was a de-facto electoral pact between the Lib Dems and Labour. Both, with very few exceptions, ran only paper candidates on the other’s territory. The Lib Dems trained all their fire nationally on the Tories and ignored Labour. And vice versa of course.
This is the nature of FPTP. If the parties on the right are split and fail to reach an agreement the left will likely win. It’s usually the other way around.
My own constituency only went Labour because Reform took away votes from the Tories. The Lib Dems were nowhere to be seen during the campaign. The Labour vote was lower than in 2017 when they lost but slightly higher than in 2019 when they lost again.
The rationale behind Starmer’s move to the right was to win Tory votes but keep the previous support. Peter Mandelson was reported to have said that Labour voters had “nowhere else to go”. They found somewhere, though, in Jonathan Ashworth’s constituency and four others too!
You are being slightly too generous with your 35% for the Labour vote.
These are the full figures for the Labour vote last three general elections:
2017: 12,877,918, 40.0% (share), 68.8% (turnout)
2019: 10,269,051, 32.1%, 67.3%
2024: 9,731,363, 33.7%, 59.9%
Undoubtedly Labour and the Lib Dems largely kept out of each other’s way. Labour did try to create some mischief in some Lib Dem targets when those MRPs showed them doing well – but I don’t think this was sanctioned from the centre. In my seat the local Labour candidate did put in a bit of an effort, in spite of weak local council strength – and ended up a close third to the Lib Dems, with the Greens putting in a good performance, and even an independent doing well (not a leftist one) – and there was no Reform candidate. Nobody put in a big campaign and the Tories easily won because the anti-Tory vote was so split. Something similar happened in Sussex Weald next door, with he Lib Dems doing a bit better. But otherwise the surrounding seats in Sussex/Kent were either clearly Lib Dem or Labour targets (with one Green-Labour fight in Brighton), and the Tories did badly. In Labour targets the Greens did quite well.
Just looking back at what was said in February:
Your post was titled “The 2024 election is over. The 2029 campaign has begun.”
I didn’t fully agree with that. I’m not in the Labour Party any longer but I still hear a lot about what is going on. Starmer hasn’t inspired the party membership and it’s been more difficult than usual to get volunteers to do the usual manual work for the recent election. I was asked myself but politely declined!
I didn’t expect that the polling which showed 45% +, earlier in the year, for the party would translate into votes on the day. It’s one thing saying to a pollster that you’ll vote Labour. It’s another to actually do it.
However even I was surprised that it was as low as 33.7%. The polling companies are probably looking at how they got the vote share so wrong but still got it right in terms of the seat count.
You also wrote:
” But the best guess is that there will be a strong populist challenge from the right to a stumbling Labour government.”
I still think my reply was valid. Especially with the election of 5 independent socialists and a couple more near misses :
Possibly, but you could be underestimating the significance of what is happening on the left.
Starmer isn’t going to find it easy keeping his MPs in order. Many will know there’s no chance of a government job, nor that much chance they will be able to retain their seats at the next election. So they will be able to do pretty much what they like and and there’s not much that Starmer will be able to do about it.
Yes I was surprised by how low the Labour poll share was. I think you are right that the government will come in for a lot of criticism from its backbenchers – the two child limit will be an early rallying point. In some ways we are back to 2005 – but I don’t think the Lib Dems are well-positioned to push a left-leaning agenda this time. But the Greens are and my guess is that they will start to cause Labour discomfort. Bristol Central was a bit of a portent.
My argument that the 2024 election was over came from the thought that the Tories weren’t even trying to stop Starmer this time, but engaged in battles to establish a populist block in time for 2029 – while Starmer was trying to head off that danger. The Tory effort in the campaign was indeed pretty feeble.
I still think there is a strong threat from the populist right, but Farage’s intervention has complicated things. An article in the FT points out that his appeal is limited by his low-tax economics small-state, which the most successful European populists have abandoned in favour of strengthening state benefits and public services. This might give an opening for a successful movement from the left.