American winter – calamity awaits the once-great country

I was wrong. Before last year’s US presidential election I said that it wasn’t the most consequential in a generation (or such longer period offered by breathless commentators); it would be no more so that the elections of 2016 (which could have done for Trump altogether) or 2020 (a weaker argument there…). A new Trump administration would soon sink into chaos and drift – a bit like Boris Johnson’s British government following the December 2019 election. In fact the new US administration is revolutionary; it is changing things as radically as the Roosevelt presidency of 1933. The election of Kamala Harris would have stopped this, and probably done for Trump for good – though who knows what would have been cooked up for 2024.

Even after the election I compared the new regime to Mr Johnson’s, though I also offered Hitler’s 1933 ascension into the chancellery as a comparison. This latter is now looking the stronger parallel. Hitler was no details man, but set a vision in which groups of underlings competed with each other to destroy the old regime, with varying levels of competence, though with more violence than the current US regime has shown so far. The chaos that I predicted has indeed come to pass, but it has not stopped the destruction. And the checks to presidential power that I had thought might come into play seem to have been neutralised. Congress has been bypassed, and the Republican majorities seem to be shrugging this off, and offering little challenge. The courts have been stacked in the new regime’s favour – as evidenced by the shocking extension to presidential immunity made by the Supreme Court last year. A doctrine of unchecked presidential authority is taking hold. Even states’ power, a cornerstone of the Republican anti-establishment rhetoric until now, is being undermined. Mr Trump’s underlings, up to the level of Vice President, openly talk of ignoring court rulings anyway; it isn’t clear what could stop them. It will be no surprise if moves are made to further undermine the democratic standards of elections.

Pretty much all of this was predicted before the election, with plenty of evidential support. While I was broadly right on the administration’s economic policies, unlike many who really should have known better, I failed to understand what was coming for the reordering of the state itself. Not all that is happening is necessarily bad. Many aspects of the state work poorly, and sometimes shock treatment – “move fast and break things”- is the best way to achieve radical change. The problem is I have no confidence in the good faith or competence of this revolution’s leaders. This is the contrast with Roosevelt. They are leading their country to a bad place.

It starts with a complete failure to understand how a modern economy works. The country’s large trade deficit is not a sign of failure – of being ripped-off by foreigners – but a sign of economic success. As Americans become more wealthy, demand for non-tradable goods and especially services grows; to make room for extra supply of these things the country must import more tradable goods and export less. This is easy to fund as the country is attractive to foreign capital. It follows that trying to reverse this, by balancing trade and bringing more manufacturing “home”, the gains will be reversed. America becomes poorer. It’s worse than that, because the government is trying to put the toothpaste back into the tube, and its policies, notably punitive tariffs, are likely to to cause economic harm with doing much corresponding good. Whether this is leading to recession is an open question, but inflation and stagnation are a stronger bet. It is not what so many Trump voters thought they were going to get.

Then there is foreign relations, though this may be less of a concern to most voters. The abrupt tearing up of treaties and promises is destroying trust, which will ultimately make things harder for America. Bullying works by picking weaker subjects off; it doesn’t work when you are trying to bully the whole world. The regime might achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine, and at least a temporary halt to the killing. But its bullying of Ukraine while soft-pedalling Russia boads ill for longer term results. Likewise the regime is giving succour to the Israeli hard right, whose ultimate aim is ethnic cleansing. That does not bode well for long term peace. It will also ultimately undermine dealing with other Middle Eastern regimes. In the Far East things are unclear. The Trump regime is full of China hawks, but Trump himself is more ambiguous. The China hawks are useful for the securing of better relations with Russia, something Mr Trump clearly wants. But he can discard them when it comes to Taiwan, and China may get its opportunity to make the island into its control, which would be a disaster for America.

And what of Americans welfare (pensions and healthcare) and government services? These are being run down, and run by Trump loyalists rather than people with competence. These will surely be weakened. Corruption is likely to take hold.

Meanwhile Mr Trump has a solid base of fanatical support. These are a combination of frustrated conservatives who love that their side is doling it out to the hated liberals, and crooks and chancers who spy opportunities to turn a profit. They will not acknowledge failure, blaming things that go wrong on an array of conspiracies and usual suspects. There seem to be enough of them to keep the regime going. Others will be afraid to speak out or act out of line. Freedom of speech may have been a conservative rallying cry, but, likes states’ rights and rule of law, they don’t mean it.

The question now is whether things will go badly or very badly. In the latter case democracy is subverted and the current regime retains and extends power beyond Trump’s four year term. A successor is found – and there are clearly a number of candidates. I don’t think this is likely. The regime will increasingly be hobbled by infighting, made more vicious by a record of failure. Mr Trump’s charisma will start to fail. Opposition will cling on in many states, and even the judiciary might draw a line. 

But a winter approaches. This is not a good time to be an American.

First published on Substack

Are there modern lessons from slavery compensation?

In the 1837 the British government passed the Slavery Compensation Act, whereby slave owners were paid compensation following the emancipation of slaves in the British Empire. Recently I started to think about this given the repeated claims that governments can’t afford to do things: such things as extra defence spending, investing in the green transition, compensating WASPI women, and so on. The slavery compensation was substantial, but government finances weren’t derailed. Surely the question of affordability shouldn’t be reduced to the level of household budgeting? Sometimes it is quite safe for governments to spend freely without raising taxes. I did some gentle internet research. I was a bit shocked.

What shocked me was that nobody seemed very interested in how the British government was able to afford the compensation, or what the economic consequences of the scheme were. Instead they focus on political questions. More recently this has turned on the injustice of slave owners being compensated for an immoral practice, while the slaves received no monetary compensation at all. This, then, inevitably, gets tangled in the question of modern demands for slavery compensation, promoted by Caribbean governments in particular. You would have thought that the economic questions would have interested writers considering these issues, but apparently not.

The amount of compensation was £20 million. That was about 5% of GDP, by modern estimates (such things weren’t measured at the time). It was, apparently 40% of the Treasury budget – an oft-quoted figure though it isn’t explained whether that is the budget before or after the compensation. Overall government receipts at this point were about 10% of GDP. At the time government debt was about 150% of GDP, a legacy of the Napoleonic wars. There was no income tax, with government revenue primarily drawn from excise duties on imports (notably foodstuffs, including, notoriously, imported corn) and alcohol. So this was a substantial sum, paid when government revenues were highly constrained, and debt at very high levels. Much of it was paid through annuities (only finally bought out in 2015). This would have greatly softened the impact on government finances – but for the most part the receivers of compensation sold their annuities for cash, so the impact would have been significant on the economy as a whole. 

What about this impact? I have seen two things mentioned. A television documentary I saw on the topic a while ago suggested that much of the funding was invested in industrial infrastructure, and railways in particular, and so helped promote the industrial transformation of Britain. The Wikipedia article I have linked above suggests that it contributed to a banking crisis – though since the main ones in Britain were in 1825 and 1866, it could not have been all that serious. I have been unable follow the reference to the article that suggested this. 

A general survey of historic government finances by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) fails to mention the episode. Income tax was introduced (or re-introduced, as it had been used in the Napoleonic Wars) in 1841, following the abolition of the Corn Laws, which reduced excise revenues. Government debt steadily fell until it was 40% of GDP at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. This was primarily due to economic growth – the level of government revenue fell to about 6-7% until the Boer War in 1900, when it returned to 10%. This era saw little inflation – attributed to strict adherence to the Gold Standard.

A further modern article on the topic of how the compensation was afforded suggests that the debt for compensation was paid off by taxes from the freed slaves – with the author getting appropriately worked up about the injustice. It is very hard to see how that could have been the case. This looks like yet another example of economic illiteracy amongst commentators and historians. And that is as far as I was able to get. There seems to be no generally available study of the economic impact of slavery compensation. It appears to have been shrugged off at the time as well as later.

It occurs to me that ignorance about economic history is widespread and almost wilful. An example is the belief that Britain lived off its empire – that the relative wealth of British people was at the expense of poverty in the colonies. Economists that have tried to substantiate this idea have failed. Indeed the loss of Empire in the later 20th Century coincided with a period of significant growth. The economics of slavery is doubtless mired in similar ignorance. In this case though the impact of wealth made in the sugar and cotton trades, dominated by slavery in the West Indies and America, is very visible in such places as Bristol, Glasgow and Liverpool. Still, I doubt that anybody has attempted to construct counterfactuals with the use of free labour or alternative sources of trade. It remains a very influential political narrative – that British economic success was built on the slave trade. This is not wholly implausible (unlike the story of ex-slaves paying off the compensation debt), but surely the picture is far more complex. Germany had no slave trade but built an economy that became just as powerful as Britain’s in the 19th Century.

I was hoping to use the episode as example of how governments can make substantial financial commitments without having to raise taxes. That is hard to pin down as the financial system was very different. The government was able to make the settlement using perpetual debt – which is the easiest form of debt to service, though still requiring interest payments. That would not be done today. On the other hand, since most recipients appear to have sold their bonds, there would have a substantial cash injection into the economy. What was the impact?

The first thing to remember is that money is just a social convention: it’s not for real. It’s a lubricant and not a fuel. Overall what matters is how we use real resources – labour, infrastructure, and so on. Slavery compensation created a financial windfall without directly adding to resources – potentially boosting demand without any corresponding boost to the supply side. In a modern economy that could lead to inflation. In Victorian times it could cause financial dislocation – so linking it to a banking crisis is plausible, even if it is hard to pin down what the crisis actually amounted to. 

If a financial windfall is not spent immediately, however, but simply banked or invested, then the impact on the balance of supply and demand is limited. If this translates into immediate investment spending, however, such as building railway lines, then the same problems may arise – depending on the exact circumstances. It is usually reckoned that a surge in investment spending is easier to accommodate and consumption, however – and it should, after all, lead to an increase in productive capacity. The idea of the windfall helping to propel industrial capacity and growth is therefore quite plausible. If the money is directed abroad, then it won’t impact the domestic economy either. The Wikipedia article suggests that this might have been the case for slavery compensation. But I find myself in a fact-free zone.

What of modern times? Government is much larger, with revenue at about 40% of GDP, and debt smaller, at about 100%. The currency is freely floating, but under domestic control – unlike the days of the Gold Standard. Inflation is a constant threat now in a way that it wasn’t then. There are two particular problems with large government spending commitments. The first is that the impact could be inflationary, if the recipients quickly add to overall economic demand without any corresponding supply boost. The most effective counter to this is to raise taxes to reduce demand by a corresponding amount – or “funding” the spending. But not all taxes are created equal here: capital taxes, or taxes restricted to the very wealthy, affect demand by much less. Alas very few people in the current political debate have grasped this – instead thinking of this as an analogous to household budgeting. A recent example of this debate is the green investment splurge initiated by President Joe Biden’s administration. This is alleged by Republicans to have caused an inflationary surge. And yet the increase in American inflation was hardly different to other countries that were managed much more conservatively.

The second problem with government spending splurges is on the capital markets. The government may need to fund the spending through raising debt. The capacity of the market to do so is limited, though nobody is sure by how much. The government can fund the debt through the creation of money too – but this creates problems of its own (leading straight back to the inflation problem). Also if a country, like Britain, needs to sell the debt to foreign investors there may be constraints. Ultimately the government may have to borrow in foreign currency to bring such investors in – something that adds hugely to the financial risks. Britain has never been forced to do this – but is that because the Treasury is run so conservatively? It was the financial markets that undid Liz Truss in 2023. But Ms Truss was particularly inept – and we should be careful about using this as a general warning about increasing government debt. There are solutions, other than raising taxes on income and consumption – capital taxes can be used to balance the books, or the markets can be convinced that the government will continue to have the capacity to honour the debt. This would be the case if the finance was to be used for capital projects with a good return – including boosting economic growth and tax receipts.

So let’s think about three examples where people are advocating the government boost spending: defence, green investment and the WASPI women. Defence is the most straightforward. Expenditure is likely to be fed back fairly directly into demand, without a corresponding increase in productive capacity. Economic resources are to be repurposed, from things like healthcare and consumption, to armed forces and munitions. This is likely to be inflationary if not supported by tax rises – and these need to be on income tax, national insurance or VAT to work properly. Or else by reducing public spending elsewhere. This is why it is such a political challenge for the current government. I have heard more than one commentator suggest that defence spending can boost growth – but alas that is more economic illiteracy. This is only the case if it is used to soak up spare capacity in the economy (which was the case in the 1930s, for example). This is doubtful now, unless there is a way of bringing back lots of people from sick leave and retirement. It is sometimes said that war spending has boosted the Russian economy – but inflation is growing there, so this growth is illusory. There is a lot of activity but people generally aren’t better off.

The green transition is another matter. Here the funding is being used on capital projects that boost infrastructure. For the most part these projects have clear economic benefits – especially when used to boost solar power, whose economic benefits could be substantial. Carbon capture and storage, used to prolong the use of fossil fuels, is an exception here: this looks like deadweight loss. The Labour Party suggested that it would raise £80 billion a year for a hugely ambitious programme – but then they lost their nerve and scaled back drastically. The number was a bit of a nonsense, admittedly, but the idea that the government could fund substantial green energy projects through borrowing is perfectly plausible. Of course to the extent that energy is a profitable business, a lot of this could be done through the private sector – but a lot of the infrastructure probably is best done through public ownership, and in particular the electricity grid. The government is being too cautious.

How about the WASPI women? This case is closest to slave compensation. The WASPI women were those adversely affected by in an increase on pension age, equalising it with men. They claim that they weren’t informed of the change in time to do anything about it. I haven’t been following the debate in detail, though I am instinctively sceptical of the merits of their case. Still, many politicians, including those leading the current government, have expressed support for compensation in the past. I see that an amount of a bout £60 billion has been suggested – or about 2.5% of GDP. As a one-off cost this does not have the same implications as increasing defence spending, for example. In particular it is unlikely to have a huge immediate effect on demand. A lot of the money will be saved and invested. The people concerned are retired, and doubtless want to improve their lifestyle, but they are also likely to be conservative about it, and save much of it initially. It is unlikely to do much for economic growth, however, though to the extent that the funds are used for investment, there might be some benefit; if people use it to stop working, however, there would be a negative impact. The whole thing is probably much more affordable than it looks – not unlike the slavery compensation.

Alas we will not have a sensible debate on this. Doubtless the government fears that if it gave ground on the WASPI women, it would give a boost to many other aggrieved parties (those in leasehold flats, for example). Still the costs of economic illiteracy are great indeed if governments are needlessly constrained.