Tag Archives: NHS reform

The NHS crisis: while politicians look the other way, what should we do?

The NHS is deep in a long term crisis. Last Thursday NHS England published a “call to action” outlining the emerging crisis. This attracted a day or so of news coverage, focusing mainly on a £30 billion funding gap. But there was no political debate, and the story quickly died. It was replaced yesterday by a story on the NHS’s abuse of the “Liverpool Care Pathway” for end of life care, and today by an investigation on struggling hospitals. Both stories are backwash form the continuing struggle of NHS management and staff with financial pressures. But where are the politicians? Labour are waiting to pounce on stories of struggling accident & emergency services to promote a general air of government incompetence on the NHS; the government try to play things down, blaming any problems on long standing issues not tackled by the previous government. A debate about the long-term options for the service it is not. So what should they be talking about?

The dimensions of the crisis are quite clear. Britain’s NHS is almost entirely funded from tax. But after the economic crisis of 2007-09 the tax base has shrunk. Furthermore a number of trends, not least the increasing proportion of older people, point to a slowing down of the overall rate of growth in the economy and hence taxes. And yet some of those same trends will create growing demand on the NHS. The government has promised to protect the NHS budget in real terms, much to the chagrin of right wing critics, but this will not solve the problem of rising demand. The NHS England report settled on a headline gap figure of £30 billion by 2021  – after toying with £60 billion by 2025, the number used by Health Service Journal (HSJ) in its preview.

The strategy is to buy time through efficiency savings. As a large, monolithic organisation, with weak accountability, inefficiency is rife. NHS top management has been ratcheting up pressure on the component services by progressively squeezing the available funding, , in a process known as “the Nicholson challenge” after NHS England’s chief executive, Sir David Nicholson. The NHS England report claims that this is on track to deliver its target of £20 billion efficiency savings by 2015, but there is plenty of reason to doubt its efficacy, as the number of crises with a financial root seems to grow.

But the strategic point is that efficiency is not a long term answer to the pressures. The NHS paper calls for fresh thinking, but seems to rule out most radical ideas, like charging for, or heavily restricting services, although in doing so it is only holding to the current political near-consensus (the far right does not go along with this, but everybody else does). Let’s take a step back and look at this.

The first point to make is that increased demand for health services in the economy will be met by increased supply. Occasionally you hear people suggesting that the economy can’t bear an increase. But there is no fundamental economic reason why the proportion of the economy taken up by health care cannot increase substantially. It does not depend overly on imports, and there are plenty of things the public can give up to make way (own fewer or cheaper cars or clothes, go out less, and so on and on). Healthcare offers the prospect of a longer life and less pain; it is a consumer proposition, as I have pointed out in an earlier blog, to die for. If there is demand, there will be supply. The only question is how that supply will be met.

There are broadly four ways the NHS will meet this crisis:

  1. Taxes will be progressively increased so that taxpayer funded services maintain their current profile overall. This is clearly what is favoured by most NHS insiders, and left wing policy types who like the paternalist structure of the current NHS.
  2. It will stratify into a class-based service, where only poorer people will use it, while richer people go private. This will happen because the NHS service will be considered dangerous, shoddy, and accessible only after an intolerable wait. This is largely what has happened to NHS dentistry, and it is what will happen if the NHS is allowed to muddle on with its current level of funding (or if funding is cut).
  3. The NHS will concentrate on excellence in a smaller core of services, while letting people go private for others. However healthcare has few neat boundaries, and it is difficult to see how this would work in practice.
  4. The NHS will start charging for more services, and accepting co-payments for cosmetic and other add-ons. This may be done with increased collaboration with the private sector, rather like NHS optometric services. This is the direction of travel favoured by the right, apart from those who secretly favour option 2.

These solutions are not mutually exclusive, and indeed option 3 is probably only viable in conjunction with 4.

The first strategic question is how far new taxpayer funding will be forthcoming. Many seem to assume that it will be. John Appleby, economist at the health think tank the King’s Fund,  assumes this will be so: the economy will be growing again by 2025, and public demand for increases to real spending will return. I’m not so sure: the headwinds on the economy are severe, and I don’t see any return to the growth rates we have previously seen for more than a two or three years in a row. Meanwhile demand from other areas of public expenditure has been suppressed and could bounce back. And I think public attitudes to higher taxes have changed, after the general squeeze that has been put on living standards. Some left-wingers assume there is large pot of money available from taxing rich individuals and businesses. This is open to doubt, however, and it has proved a volatile source of tax revenue both Britain in the past, and to other economies, like California’s, whose public funding depends heavily on taxes on the rich.

Besides, I do not think that taxpayer funding is particularly efficient. It means that resources tend to be allocated top down according to political objectives, and not where it is really needed. And difficult problems tend to be left unsolved rather than confronted. My guess is that we will end up with option 4, after having given options 2 and 3 a try. It will continue to be a very bruising time for the NHS.

For those that want to avoid this, I think the most promising way forward is to bring health services into a complete rethink of public services to make them more integrated with each other, and centred on people rather than symptoms. And in case you think that sounds like motherhood and apple pie, its practical consequence means dismantling current power structures, and pushing towards democratically accountable local control. That will not be popular amongst NHS professionals, and we know how much noise they can make. Some on the left are starting to think this way, and while I don’t trust the left, with their penchant for paternalism, this may be the basis for a useful political coalition. One interesting aspect of this is that the other services (personal care, housing) with which the NHS would be integrated are not “free at the point of use”, considered so sacred in the NHS, which may allow the whole question of charging and co-payments to be fudged in a constructive way. Here’s hoping that something can be achieved along these lines.

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The NHS: how the accountants are hiding dubious policies

The NHS is quite high up the news agenda these days. From the media there seem to be two big issues: culture and privatisation. The mainly right-wing press say that much of the NHS lacks a caring culture and this often leads to a breakdown of service. Left-wingers, and NHS insiders, worry about the new commissioning rules, and whether unscrupulous private companies will bid their way into contracts that destroy what is good about the service. These are both valid concerns, but a third issue should be causing more controversy than it does: funding. Not so much the NHS’s overall budget, though that too is worthy of debate, but how it allocates what it has. Recently the Health Service Journal has highlighted no less than three quite distinct issues on the topic. Politicians should be paying attention.

The first was an opinion article on 14th February by Robert Royce, a visiting fellow at the King’s Fund, the health think tank. His subject was the Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust: but not the Francis report, but the preceding report by Monitor, its regulator. This report questioned the trust’s financial viability, suggesting that the hospital lacked scale. Hospitals like Mid Staffs are funded mainly through something referred to as “the tariff”, and which used to be called by Orwellian name “Payment by Results”, which was put in place by the New Labour government. This puts a price on every service episode the hospital performs: payment by activity, rather than by results. This system is often portrayed as being a commercial, market type discipline, but the tariff looks like no market tariff that I have ever seen. It is massively complicated, requiring big information systems resources to work.

What the tariff does remind me of is a transfer pricing system to allocate costs internally between two fractious units of the same organisation, who hope that by referring the problem to management accountants they can find an objective resolution. As the accountants grapple with the complexity of the problem they add layer upon layer of detail, in a hopeless quest to replicate the infinite complexities of real life, resulting in something which is nearly useless for management purposes. The system is designed for a political rather than a commercial environment, with the aim of pretending that strategic value judgements are mere technical problems. In the NHS almost all commentators go along with this pretence.

Mr Royce points to one pernicious value judgement in the tariff. It is that emergency services are bad, and elective services are good. Mid Staffs is perfectly viable financially on its elective services, but is being dragged down by losses on its emergency services. What if the tariff were raised for emergency services and lowered for elective, to genuinely reflect the underlying costs? The the hospital’s viability might look altogether different.

The second article was in the magazine’s “Resource Centre” section on 14th March, and is entitled The real reason for “failing” hospitals. It is by Sheena Asthana and Alex Gibson from Plymouth University. This is dressed up a piece of academic data analysis, but it is politically pointed. The authors look at the funding formula for Primary Care Trusts (PCTs: the bodies that fund the hospitals, at least until 31 March), and tries to correlate troubled hospitals and underlying population characteristics. They find that there is a strong correlation between hospital stress and a high proportion of older people in their catchment area. Their claim is that the funding formula is diverting financial resources away from these areas of greater need towards areas that are less wealthy – and this is the fundamental reason why so many hospitals are failing.

The last government was obsessed with addressing “health inequalities”, an expression that I hate because it implies that the solution is making things worse for the better off, rather then improving the lot of the worse off. And if Ms Asthana’s and Mr Gibson’s study is to be taken at face value, that is exactly what is happening. The present government show no sign that they want to address this awkward issue, and, according to the authors, much the same allocation is being ported into the new system.

The third article was another opinion article, this time by accountant (sorry, independent consultant and former NHS finance director) Noel Plumridge on 21st March. This looks at something that has been bothering me. If the NHS budget is protected, and increasing at a rate faster than most people’s pay is rising (2.6% as against 1%), how come so many NHS organisations are under such financial pressure? He finds the figures for next year’s budget less than transparent but concludes that there are no plans to spend a large chunk of the money at all: they are destined for unspent surpluses or contingency funds to “mitigate risk”. These surpluses are a point of difficulty: the individual trusts that make a surplus are supposedly allowed to reinvest them in future years. But under Treasury rules the NHS as a whole must hand the funds back to the Treasury for good. Is this just a backhand way of breaching the promise to ringfence NHS funding?

I only subscribe to the HSJ because I forgot to cancel it after my attempt to find a job in the NHS ended in failure – now I find interesting articles nearly every week. What these three articles show is that there aren’t enough accountants in politics. NHS leaders are being allowed to get away with some highly contentious political policies by dressing them up in complicated accountancy.

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Let’s learn the right lessons from the Winterbourne View scandal

On Monday the government published its serious case review into the Winterbourne View abuse scandal.  Winterbourne View was a specialist private sector hospital for learning disabled and autistic people – people who were sectioned and could not fend for themselves – “vulnerable” in the jargon.  The BBC Panorama programme filmed some spectacular cases of staff abusing patients.  A closer look didn’t make things look any better – abuse had being going on for years, and the hospital was not remotely doing the job it was being paid to do.  This is laid bare in the report.  All sorts of people fell down on the job – the hospital’s owners, police and other services, and the Care Quality Commission.  This should not distract us from the central lesson which the report makes clear – the commissioning of these services was seriously deficient.

The report was published on a day when the news was dominated by the Olympics and by the Coalition spat over Lords reform.  Perhaps it is a pity that this meant it did not get the public attention it deserved.  But it may be just as well.  In the hands of the usual top news journalists and editors, the wrong lessons would have been drawn.  Instead the coverage has been a bit more balanced and considered – I have even been able to pick up mature and balanced coverage from BBC’s Radio 4.  Even so, I’m not sure if the right messages are getting through to the people that matter.    There are some big red herrings.

The first red herring is the use of private sector providers to deliver care.  The report and headlines made much of the hospital owner’s pursuit of profit as being the reason they failed to provide a proper service, in spite of being paid quite well.  But this is nothing new – and there are plenty of shining examaples of good practice in the private sector.  The problem was that they were not being held to account.  Terrible things happen in public sector organisations too, if nobody is asking what they are getting for their money.

Which leads to a second red herring.  An early “lesson” was that the Care Quality Commisssion’s inspection regime was too light touch, and that inspections by this national body should be more frequent and more thorough.  But we mustn’t rely on these big inspectorates, who often fail to understand local nuances and issues, and can end up being excessively confrontational.  At best they can guarantee a certain level of mediocrity.

And thirdly there is the role of family.  The patients at Winterbourne were often from a long way away, which meant that it was much more difficult for the family to stay in touch.  This was condemned as being part of the problem.  This is right up to a point.  Public service commissioners are far too casual about sending people a long way from where they have their roots.  I am uncomfortable with the NHS reformers’ constant refrain of creating fewer but bigger specialist facilties for everything – though they always point to statistical evidence.  But while family can and (usually) should be an important part of somebody’s care, the system should not depend on them.

No, the real issue is with the commissioners of public services, within the NHS and local authorities.  They should take more responsibility for the services they commission and devote more time to holding them to account.  At this point it is very easy to be swept away by a debate over structures, procedures and responsibilities, seeing this as simply an exercise in public procurement, as one might outsource street cleaning, for example.  But again, that is not the important point.

At the heart of the commissioning of social and health services should be the client or patient.  Their individual requirements should be assessed, treatment individually tailored and their progress followed with human interest.  The patients of Winterbourne were sent there by commissioners who thought their job was done by just placing them there.  What was supposed to assessment, treatment and rehabilitation, a process implying progress towards a goal, turned into warehousing.  That should be almost as outrageous to us as the abuse itself.  If the commissioners had been following their patients, they would have picked up their lack of progress, and either worked with the hospital to improve it, or simply taken their patients elsewhere.

This isn’t rocket science.  My wife is a care manager at a local authority, dealing with drug rehabs.  Her authority takes an interest in their clients as individuals, and this invovles meeting clients at the rehab facility from time to time to check on progress…and cutting out facilities that aren’t up to standard.  The problem is that some public sector managers take a more industrial view of things, trying to drive efficiencies by doing things in bulk and treating problems and performance indicators rather than people.  This can give rise to some short term cost savings, but it quickly becomes self-defeating, as processes that fail to take account of people as individuals fail to solve their problems, and you end up with warehousing on a minimum cost basis.  But it is not value for money you keep adding to the workload.

Unfortunately in this aspect of public services, not much much can be learnt from the private sector.  Private sector techniques (lean management, business process engineering) can lead to a more people-centred approach if applied properly – but ultimately the private sector answer to difficult clients is either to pass them on to somebody else, or turn them into dependents and warehouse them for a fee.  Warehousing problems rather than solving them can be a lucrative business, as the owners of Winterbourne, Castlebeck Ltd, clearly saw.

I hope that the government’s ideas for GP-led health commissioning, and integration between local authority and NHS care, will lead the commissioning process to the right place, as they should in theory.  But the bureaucratic obstacles are huge.  It would help to have a clearer vision from on high.

 

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The G4S fiasco poisons attitudes to the private sector

The British contractor G4S has specacularly failed to find anything like enough staff to support its contract to provide security staff for the London Olympics…which start in less than two weeks.  The details aren’t clear yet, but this one has all the makings of a fiasco that will be examined in deph in MBA courses for a long time.  A bigger question is the effect it will have on public attitudes to the private sector here in Britain.

For now the politicians and journalists are having some fun.  “Is this a humiliating shambles for G4S?  Yes or No?” (or similar words) one MP asked Nick Buckles, the hapless G4S Managing Director, this morning, showing the sort of skills of forensic questioning that make people wonder how useful parliamentary select committees really are. Mr Buckles had to agree.  It wasn’t just the size of the recrutiment gap, it is that nobody at the top seemed to have any idea that there was trouble until a couple of weeks ago.

Another revealing encounter was on Radio 4’s Today programme this morning.  John Humphreys was interviewing the senior police officer coordinating Olympics security.  The latter referred to G4S as a “partner”.  They’re not a partner, retoted Mr Humphreys, they just a private company only interested in profit.  And that seems to summarise a widespread attitude here.  Private companies are greedy and heedless of ethical standards.  Meanwhile the good old public services, like the police, the armed services or the NHS are selfless public servants working for the good of us all.

What a difference 30 years makes!  Back in the 1980s public services were supposed to be crassly managed, unable to control their unions and unable to deliver anything on time or efficiently.  The private sector on the other hand, the odd (state supported) car manufacturer apart, was all enterprise, innovation and efficiency.  It says a lot for the process of public sector reform that has happened since that public services command such respect now.  The private sector, on the other hand, has not come out of the banking crisis well, as the parallel case of Barclays seems to demonstrate.

This matters because further public sector reform, especially in the NHS, implies greater use of private businesses.  This was already a hard sell politically.  It’s not getting any easier.  Should it?

Well, management screwups are by no means the unique preserve of the private sector.  Last week a coroner reported on a case of a patient dying at our local hospital, St George’s.  This looks like a case too many people being involved, not aware of the complete picture, and nobody taking the initiative to sort problems out.  The hospital said that it had changed its procedures to prevent future incidents like it.  You can almost guarantee that this means an extra check or process spatulaed on top the ones already there – theoretically dealing with the problem, but actually making the process more complex and difficult to manage.  Reengineering of operations to deal with risks like this seems to infinitely more difficult in public sector organisations than in private sector ones, perhaps because it means trampling over well established demarkation lines.  Cases of bad management abound.  The quality of police management was shown in very bad light by last year’s riots, especially in London, where they were caught flat footed by youngsters with Blackberrys.  And as for the armed forces, whose public stock is currently very high, the amount of money they have wasted in equipment procurement programmes is absolutely eyewatering.

And as for the G4S scandal, the wider story is not necessarily against the private sector.  The company is clearly accountable, and is picking up the extra costs instead of the taxpayer.  And surely the procurement process is a much to blame as the contractor?  G4S may have been suffering from “winner’s curse” – required to cut costs to win the contract, and then finding that it had been unrealistic, or taking too many risks.  Realistic or cautious bidders simply get eliminated.  But this is a well known procurement problem – and surely the commissioners should have seen fit to take precautions?  Some rather obvious questions are being asked about how such a large and important contract was being supervised.

And it’s interesting to reflect a little further on the currently popular subject of “culture” in organisations, that, for example, was supposed to be so bad in Barclays.  Well senior managers not knowing about problems building up within their organisation is often a sign of bad culture.  Mr Buckles said he was a “no excuses” manager; so were staff afraid to pass up bad news?  The twist on this is that this sort, tough, no excuses style of management is beloved of politicians and the public (provided they aren’t actually working in the organisations concerned).  I’m not sure that most politicians would recognise healthy corporate culture if they saw it.  And that is bad news for the public sector.

So it would be a pity if this episode slowed down the process of involving private companies in public service reform.  But it would be as well to learn the lessons for public sector procurement and contract management.

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What can Lib Dems learn from the NHS debacle?

The NHS is proving a political nightmare for the Lib Dems.  This reflects a failure to develop a clear vision for the service before the election.

The NHS is now a toxic issue for the Lib Dems.  This is not because the voters are turning against the party on the issue, as they did for student loans.  In the overheated rhetoric surrounding the issue there have been many claims that the public will abandon the party over this latest betrayal.  But the public judges parties on what actually happens to the NHS, not on the speculations of excited activists and commentators.  And so far as front line services are concerned, nothing much has changed, and probably not a huge amount will as a result of the reforms… a major difference with the student fees issue.

No, the damage is being wrought within the party’s activists and members, as this summary of blogs after the Gateshead Conference shows.  Many feel an acute sense of betrayal by the leadership, and a number have left the party; more may follow.  This weakness is being cleverly exploited by Labour; but they didn’t start it.  Lib Dem activists themselves have not required outside assistance.

The party is all over the place.  The outcome of the Gateshead conference last weekend (which I was unable to attend) merely added to the confusion.  The emergency motion to abandon the Bill was not called, the representatives voting for a compromise motion supported by Shirley Williams – but a key paragraph was taken out of this motion by a narrow vote, leaving it saying not much at all.  This has given rebels in parliament cover to break the whip, but not placed serious pressure on the leadership and those not inclined to rebel, who do not see it as a worthwhile expenditure of political capital in the coalition, compared to tax policy, say.

This confusion has deep roots.  What on earth do the Lib Dems want with the NHS?  There is no clarity whatsoever.  I can count four distinct factions.  Currently most the most vocal strand are social democrats (like Shirley Williams, a living saint to many members) – who want a strong, nationally controlled monopoly service, which is able to provide a uniform standard right through the country (England in this case – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been allowed to get away).  They are relaxed about centralisation, and indeed all the amendments made to the bill over the last year at their behest point to a highly centralised provision.  Next come the economic liberals, with whom the party leadership tend to sympathise.  While this group has not developed any clear vision, they like the idea of what economist John Kay calls “disciplined pluralism” – in other words preserving a choice of providers wherever possible, so long as they are properly accountable.  These people are very relaxed about whether the NHS uses direct employees, third sector organisations, or, indeed, private companies to deliver its service.  A third group consists of NHS insiders – who basically resist any change in practice if not in theory, and who mainly argue for allocating more taxpayer funding through existing structures, whatever they happen to be at the time.  This group was led by Dr Graham Winyard of Winchester (and a former NHS high-up), who has now left the party.  And lastly (because this group is now largely drowned out), we have community politicians.  These want to see much more devolution to local politicians, and a bigger role for local authorities in particular; this group is relaxed about the  “postcode lottery”, so long as it is balanced by postcode accountability.  This group is close to the heart of traditional post-War Liberalism, and closest to my personal views (in spite of my Social Democrat provenance).

The original Bill was essentially a product of the economic liberals and community politicians (amongst whom we should count Paul Burstow, the Lib Dem health minister) within the party, working with Tory Health Secretary Andrew Lansley, whose attitude is quite close to Lib Dem economic liberals.  The resistance was started up by NHS insiders like Graham Winyard, and quickly swept in social democrats.  This alliance overwhelmed the party leadership at last March’s Sheffield conference.  There followed the “pause” in the reforms, and a raft of amendments that took the reforms in a highly social democratic direction, leaving economic liberals and community politicians disenchanted but hoping something could be retrieved from the wreckage.  But then the NHS insiders dug their heels in, as one professional body after another advised killing the whole reform.  This fractured the whole process and left the party with a set of reforms that nobody is very keen on, and to which many are vehemently opposed.

The wider membership, and most activists, are pragmatists, who can’t be pigeon-holed into any of the four groups that have shaped the debate.  Their confusion and general scepticism is understandable .  But this reflects a vacuum at the party’s idealogical heart.  We can agree on liberal social values, internationalism and inclusiveness – but the party seems to have no settled views on how to run the state.

The party should not get too worked up about this of itself.  It shares this confusion with the other main political parties (just try to make sense of the Labour position), and I’m sure the minor parties too if they could ever be forced into making a stand.  All successful political parties are coalitions of one kind or another.  But the party failed to hammer out its own internal compromise before the election, in the way that Vince Cable managed to for tax policy.  Formation of policy at conference was too much a matter of seeking consensus.  There were some quite radical elements of official, conference approved policy (like abolishing Strategic Health Authorities), but little awareness amongst members of the implications of official policy.  The original Bill was probably quite a well crafted compromise between our official policy and Andrew Lansley’s ideas (Paul Burstow certainly thought so).  But as soon as the heat was applied, official Lib Dem policy counted for nothing – it had not been engrained on members’ and activists’ consciences.

So where next?  The first point is that Liberal Democrats must realise that they either hang together with the Tories, or else the two parties will be hung separately on the NHS.  The Tories will curb their privatising zeal; the Lib Dems need to stop being so destructive.  There is no future in the parties scoring points off each other on this issue -they both need to show that all the apocalyptic talk is hot air.  I expect this means that we’ll have to find some extra funding before 2015.

And Liberal Democrats need to forge their own vision for the NHS, hopefully in time for 2015.  In doing so each of the various interest groups will have to compromise.  The best way of doing this is to have some controversial debates and votes at conference – like we did with tax policy.  Much better to have the arguments before the policy is agreed than after we try to implement it.

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The friendless NHS reforms

The savages are circling around Andrew Lansley and his NHS reforms.  Or translated into something more politically correct,  the indigenous tribes have cornered the contemptuous invader, and are closing in for the kill.

Stories have been floating in the press that David Cameron is about to sack Mr Lansley and give way on most of his reforms, and particularly those that need legislative approval.  Mr Cameron’s expressions of “full confidence” cuts little ice in this football-mad country, where club chairman habitually express full confidence in managers the day before sacking them. Mr Lansley and the reforms appear friendless.  The various medical lobbies are building up against them; every few days another comes out against.  The Tory press is hostile to indifferent.  Lib Dem colleagues are urging me to sign a petition against the Health & Social Care Bill which is at their centre.

I can’t quite bring myself to sign, as somebody that basically supports reform.  But I now think that they were a political mistake not really worth fighting for.  And that may well be Mr Cameron’s view too.  The risks of persisting with it are rising.  There seems little chance of things settling down in time for the 2015 election, by which time chaos in the NHS could well be a top political issue.  When the Coalition took over, the NHS had recovered its previously poor political standing.  So far as the public was concerned, it wasn’t broke so didn’t need fixing.  On the other hand if the government U-turns now, there is quite a good chance that the matter will blow over.  Financial crises and hospital closures are bound to continue, but the whole thing will be rendered less toxic without these reforms to blame for everything.  The political calculation seems quite clear, which is why a growing number of Tories are pushing for Lansley to go.

What would happen if Lansley went and the Bill was dropped?  The new health secretary would be left with an enormous amount of executive power to continue a reform process – after all that is why the administrative reforms have made so much progress without the Bill becoming law.  Ironically a lot of the Bill was about curbing this executive power and making it more accountable.  But the focus of reform would be explicitly to make the service more efficient as demographic changes place it under ever more pressure.  This would be a lot more difficult for Labour to attack, since that was what they were saying when in power.

It hasn’t happened yet, of course.  I feel a bit disappointed that things have come to this.  I dislike much of the criticism that the reforms have attracted, and especially to the resistance to the use of private sector providers, and the sharing of facilities with fee paying patients.  The current NHS comprises a lot of good services swimming in a sea of mediocrity, and it has reached the limit of what can be provided if funded only from taxation.  The GP side in particular is inefficient and lacks accountability.  Beneficial changes require extraordinary amounts of effort to implement.  There was a lot of nonsense and gobbledegook in the PCT-led commissioning introduced by the last government, largely designed by management consultants.

Still the reform process was too broad and too fast, and became ever more muddled as the process encountered resistance.  I won’t mourn its passing.

 

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Time to wake up to the de-industrialisation of advanced economies

Trying to understand the global economic crisis?  This article from Joe Stiglitz is required reading.

I have flagged it already on Facebook and Twitter, but without much in the way of reflection. In fact it has produced an epiphany moment for me.  I have maligned Professor Stiglitz in a past blog as producing only superficial commentary on the crisis, alongside his fellow Nobel laureate Paul Krugman.  This was based on one or two shorter articles in the FT and some snatches on the radio; I wasn’t reading or listening carefully enough.  Professor Stiglitz is one of the foremost economists on the current scene.  He used to be part of the Clinton administration, and worked at the World Bank in the 1990s, but his views proved politically unacceptable.  He also wrote the standard text book on public economics, which I used in my not so recent degree course.

The article is wonderful on many levels, but the epiphany moment for me came with his observation that, underlying the current crisis, is a long-term decline of manufacturing employment in the US, and by implication, other advanced economies too.  He draws an interesting parallel with the Great Depression, which was caused, he claims, by a comparable shift from agricultural employment – again in the US; I think that such a shift was less marked in Britain, but the depression was also less severe.  This decline in employment brought about a doom-loop of declining demand across the economy as a whole – which was only reversed by World War 2.  The war effort caused a boom in manufacturing industry which was readily redeployed into the postwar economy.  This view of the Great Depression rises above the fierce controversies over fiscal and monetary policy, and places them in a proper context.

We have been witnessing the decline in manufacturing employment for some years, and grappling with its social consequences.  The important point is that it is mainly irreversible. It has been brought about by technological change, which has improved productivity.  There is a limit to the number of manufacturing products that we can consume – just as there is a limit to the food we can consume, and we are at that limit.  So the number of jobs declines.

Of course the picture is complicated by the rise of manufacturing in the developing world, and especially China, and their exports to the developed world.  In the US I am sure, and certainly in the UK, more manufacturing output is now imported than exported, causing a further loss of jobs.  This is reversible, though, and in due course will reverse, as the developing world advances and loses its temporary competitive edge.  But this won’t be enough to reverse the overall trend of rising productivity.

But advancing productivity should be good news in the long run.  It releases the workforce to do other things, or, if people prefer, to increase leisure time.  So what replaces the manufacturing jobs, in the way that manufacturing took over from agriculture?  Services, of course.  What is, or should be, the product of these services?  Improved wellbeing.

Services have rather a poor reputation in our society.  Traditionalists see them as ephemeral, compared to the real business of making things – a bit like Soviet planners were obsessed with producing steel rather than consumer goods.  More thoughtful people associate them with poor quality jobs in fast food restaurants or call centres.  But it doesn’t have to be this way.

We need to develop clearer ideas of what tomorrow’s service-based economy will look like. That’s important because the way out of the current crisis is through investments that will take us closer to this goal, just as war led to investment in manufacturing in the 1940s (and earlier in Europe).

And the key to this is thinking about wellbeing.  This is important because one of the answers could be an increase in leisure, hobbies and voluntary activities – which is not normally regarded as economic activity at all.  Reflecting on this, I think are two areas whose significance will grow and where investment should be made, both of which raise awkward political problems – health and housing.

It is easy to understand that health and social care will take up a higher proportion of a future economy than they do now, and not just because of demographic changes.  These services are vital to wellbeing.  But we are repeatedly told that we can’t afford to expand them.  And that is because we are reaching the limits of what state-supplied, taxpayer funded services can deliver in the UK. (In the US it’s another story for another day).  The health economy of tomorrow will have a larger private sector component, whether integrated with the NHS or parallel to it.  But what should our priorities now be, while this private sector is on the back foot?  It seems sensible to make the NHS more efficient and effective, but foolish to cut jobs.  We should be building the skill base alongside the reform programme.  The chief critics of the government’s NHS plans (including the Labour front bench) are that NHS reforms should be stopped so that they can focus on the critical business of raising efficiency.  But maybe it should be the other way round – we should be pushing ahead with reform, but relaxing the efficiency targets and letting the costs rise a bit until the economy starts showing greater signs of life. then, as any cuts are made the private health sector can take up the slack.

Perhaps housing is pushing at the boundaries of what “services” are.  We traditionally view this as a capital investment.  But what I mean is providing more and better places for people to live in, whether they own them or not.  Most of the country is quite well off here, but poor housing is probably what divides rich from poor more than anything else – and more investment in the right places (decently sized social housing) could rebalance things nicely and dramatically improve wellbeing.

But beyond this we badly need to get out of a manufacturing mindset, both in the private and public sectors.  We should not view division of labour and specialisation as the ideal form of organisation (massive call centres, and so on), and we should value listening skills much more – I nearly wrote “communication skills” but most people understand this about getting over what you want to say, not understanding what your customer or service user actually needs.  This is happening only very slowly.

So I would add a third priority: education.  We need to greatly expand the teaching of life skills at school and elsewhere.  This would not only help build the skills that tomorrow’s economy needs.  It would help people make better choices in a changing world.

 

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Affording the NHS

The British government has been talking darkly about the exploding demands on the National Health Service, which will rapidly make it unaffordable if it is not reformed.  This has recently been challenged by Professor John Appleby, at the health think tank King’s Fund.  This was in a recent article in the British Medical Journal, behind a paywall, but summarised by the BBC here.  This question goes to the heart of health policy in the UK, but politicians dare not discuss it – because it puts the very principles of the sacred NHS in question.  But the problem will not go away.

According to some figures on Wikipedia Britian spent an unremarkable 8% of its national income on health, compared to over 16% in the US, before the financial crisis struck.  Those figures will be higher now, since our income has shrunk, but the relativities will be much the same.  The comparison between the two countries is usually held up to show how ineffective US health spending is, since health outcomes look generally pretty poor there.  But the comparison can be looked at the other way.  The US can afford to spend more than 16% of its national income on health and still remain one of the most prosperous countries on the planet.  There is nothing mysterious about this.  Developed countries are long past the level where basic human needs of food and shelter are met; how we choose to spend the surplus is up to us, and there is no reason why we can’t choose health care over cars, designer clothes or big holidays.  It’s not as if it requires massive imports to sustain it.

You can take this line of reasoning further.  The basic proposition of health care is to reduce pain and prolong life; these are consumer propositions to, well, die for.  Suppose we lived in the economist’s free market utopia, where health spending was a matter of individual choice in a perfectly competitive free market with no information asymmetries.   There is no reason to think that health expenditure would not be higher than the 8% or so we currently spend in Britain, or indeed as high the US figure.  We can perfectly easily afford it.

That’s not the problem.  The problem is paying for it almost entirely through unspecific taxes, the core design principle of the NHS.  And here the government is on much stronger ground.  There is an upper limit to how much tax we can raise for health care.  Up to a certain point, of course, the NHS model works perfectly well.  Look on the taxes as an insurance premium and it helps spread risk in a way that people like.  But the more you spend, the more the weaknesses of the model are exposed.

  • There is no direct line of sight between what you pay and what you get.  How on earth are you supposed to decide whether you are getting value for money?
  • You have no choice in the level of service you get.  One size fits all.
  • People who are better off may feel that they are paying too much relative to what they get.  This may not be quite as strong an argument as it first appears, since the less well off pay a lot of tax through cigarettes, alcohol, petrol and VAT – but the perception is still a problem.
  • Taxes create a drag on the rest of the economy, reducing incentives to work and therefore shrinking the resources available.

America is able to get away with much higher levels of health expenditure because so much of it comes from private insurance premiums and direct private payments for treatment.  But even there a battle royal is developing over how to balance taxes and government support.

Of course, to some putting up taxes is the right way to go.  France and Sweden get away with higher tax burdens than the UK after all.  But this is very fraught.  Some think you can go after big companies and very rich people and leave everybody else.  This is not as easy as it sounds though, since this wealth is very mobile.  Property is not mobile, of course, but raising taxes on property is probably as politically toxic in Britain as taxing fuel is in the US.  There is also a problem if too much tax revenue comes from the very rich or corporations – these start to acquire more political weight.  Which leaves the not-so-rich.  But these people are under pressure and feel over-taxed – Ed Miliband’s “squeezed middle”.

So I think the government is right.  We have hit the limit of what the country can afford for tax-funded free-at-the-point-of-use health system.  But we have not hit the limit of what people are prepared to spend if it’s their own money and for their own benefit.  The risk to the NHS is that the more affluent middle classes start to opt out of NHS services, depriving them of critical mass and undermining the principle of social solidarity.  This has already happened to NHS dentistry.

Nasty.  In the last years of the previous government the issue of co-payments was quite high up the political agenda: the possibility of NHS patients topping up their treatments with their own money to get things not on the basic menu.  This had become politically charged because of the costs of some rather questionable cancer treatments which the NHS were denying but which people were prepared to pay for.  The Conservatives clearly considered the topic politically toxic, since they have fudged the issue of cancer treatments with a bit of extra funding.  Labour and the Lib Dems were inching towards accepting co-payments, though I expect both parties are now bouncing back.

But in my view co-payments is the best way to relieve the pressure.  The NHS should define a basic menu of treatments that everybody is entitled to, but accept payments for anything outside this.  This undermines one of the sacred founding ideas of the NHS, that everybody gets the same, no matter how wealthy.  But it is better than the alternatives.  It’s the debate we should be having.

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Why are NHS managers so unpopular?

Health Service Journal (HSJ) was on its high horse last week.  Its front cover says “The Big Lie exposed: the truth about NHS management”.  The proximate cause is a report by the King’s Fund called The Future of Leadership and Management in the NHS.  This report suggests that the NHS doesn’t have too many managers, and that, if anything the service is under-managed.  The HSJ is directed at NHS managers, and it is easy to see why they are so fed up.  But the HSJ coverage has a blind spot.  It doesn’t ask how the NHS got itself into this situation, and why NHS managers have become politically toxic.  It’s no use waving around King’s Fund reports; if NHS managers don’t understand of this, they will struggle to reverse it.

But let’s clear the decks first.  The idea that the NHS has too many managers as opposed to those “front line” staff is silly, and the political target to reduce their number is at best unhelpful and at worst positively damaging.  In order to deploy those front-line resources most effectively, they need to be properly managed.  Huge strides have been made by the NHS through more and better management over the last couple of decades.  Furthermore, my impression of the quality of NHS management is that it is easily up to the same quality as the private sector.  That, of course, is not as much comfort as it might be, given that crass management is pretty rampant in the private sector.  So a lot of the political comments made about NHS management are unjust, unfair and often just plain untrue.

So what’s gone wrong?  Well a clue comes in the frequent use of the word “bureaucrat” by politicians.  This is a word thick with negative connotations, of insensitivity to people’s real needs and of the arbitrary exercise of power.  Many of the public’s interactions with NHS management have left just this sort of impression.

The NHS is a hierarchical organisation, with pretty much all accountability through a single man at the top, the Secretary of State.  To most people this is no accountability at all.  One man can’t possibly grasp the intricacies of any particular local situation.  So local NHS officials have huge amounts of effectively arbitrary power.  And they rub our noses in it.

When the local NHS where I live executed a 180 degree turn and decided to close a local hospital rather than develop it, they rode roughshod over local feeling.  A local official just told us the area was too posh to have a hospital.  After a kerfuffle involving the local Labour (at the time) MP, more facilities were promised nearby in an appropriately less posh place – but of course these were soon cut, even before last year’s election.

The problem for most NHS managers is, I think, that they don’t remotely get what the problem here is.  Tough decisions have to be made.  If we followed local opinion all the time the NHS would go bust in days; if we kept consulting nothing would get done.  We have clear mission and we execute it.  NHS managers seem to bristle at the idea of genuine local accountability.  HSJ itself opposed the Lib Dem proposal of directly elected health boards.  Chaos.  Postcode lotteries.  Working for people that don’t understand.  And so on.  NHS managers are all too happy with their hierarchies, allowing them to pass the blame upwards the whole time.

But the local NHS is taking political decisions all the time.  For example, reducing health inequalities, a key local NHS objective, is loaded with political judgements.  A key political objective is to maintain middle class consent for the service; without middle class users the NHS would collapse (and we already have the example of NHS dentistry to show that).  So treating them like muck because they are on the wrong side of the equality equation should be a no-no.  Politicians can see that easily; bureaucrats can’t – it’s just not their problem.

And once you are perceived as an insensitive bureaucrat, the rest follows pretty quickly.  An organisation as large as the NHS will always throw up examples of crass management, which will be gleefully reported by patients and clinical staff alike.  And if managers are overstretched, they are bound to drop some balls too.  Episodes such as the Mid-Staffs fiasco add grist to the mill (and incidentally I did not sense much outrage from other NHS managers in the HSJ coverage of that sorry affair).  Throw in the management consultant blather dropped on the NHS (World Class Commissioning and such), and you have a massive stock of ammunition.

So NHS managers need a lot more political sensitivity, and should welcome more genuine political accountability instead of resisting it.  The NHS reforms are meant to help this, though whether do, of course, is another matter.

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