I am finding it much easier to blog on Substack that here, and I’m starting to think that I should stop posting here at all, and subscribe my loyal email followers directly to Substack.
Anyway, I posted on Substack last week on the topic of Ukraine, and then went abroad for a few days – not posting it here. I returned yesterday and I’ve done an update. I’m posting both here.
Here’s the first, posted on 17 February
What can Trump achieve in Ukraine?
Don’t expect a lasting settlement
Gloom is spreading over European politicians as the nature of the USA’s Trump administration becomes more explicit. They are joining the legions of people shocked by that regime doing pretty much what they said they were going to do, and having to discard to the more optimistic gloss that they had been hoping for. Commentary is being overwhelmed by this sense of shock, which is not very helpful for people trying to understand what is happening. The forthcoming negotiation over the Ukraine war is about three things: a ceasefire, American military and financial support for Ukraine, and sanctions. The Trump regime simply doesn’t have the bandwidth to deal with more complicated problems, like a territorial settlement or a long-term security architecture.
First, let’s look at these three in turn. I have no doubt that Donald Trump sincerely wants the killing to stop. For all his violent talk he is actually quite squeamish about violence – and he craves the recognition that he would get from halting the actual exchange of fire. The only practical way of achieving this is an early ceasefire based on the current position of the two sides, pending some further form of negotiation – in which his regime will not really engage. Other members of the regime, such as the Vice President, JD Vance, are probably less bothered by this, however. And Russia does not want a ceasefire without getting more of what it wants to neutralise Ukraine and make it easier to attack at a future date.
The biggest prize for the Trump regime is to stop financial and military aid to Ukraine. They have developed a narrative that this aid is creating hardship in America itself – and this seems to be accepted by the bulk of their supporters. They imagine that cutting all foreign aid (excepting Israel, of course), and waste within Federal bureaucracy, will transform the country’s budget deficit problem. Many senior people in the administration, including the President, almost certainly believe this. In fact it is only by tackling Social Security (i.e. state pensions) and health spending that a serious dent in the US finances will be made; that is off-limits. This is weakest part of the regime’s negotiating position. Russia thinks that it can win relatively easily if this support is withdrawn – after all the turning point in the war so far came when US aid was suspended at the end of 2023. However this does offer US leverage over Ukraine.
America’s negotiating position is much stronger when it comes to sanctions. Europe has a stronger incentive to lift these than America does – as that would allow European countries to diversify their sources of natural gas – and away from America. Because of this strength, the Trump regime is placing huge reliance on it. It is hard to know how important this is to the Russians.
The American hope is that the lifting of sanctions will be enough for Russia to agree to an immediate ceasefire, and that the prospect of loss of American aid will do the same for Ukraine. This might be combined with a limited swap of territory: with Ukraine withdrawing from the Kursk region, and Russia from the Kharkiv one. Some kind of negotiation process would then be put in place for a longer term settlement that will never in fact happen. America will block Ukraine’s access to NATO – but they will be unable to stop European countries from giving security guarantees. It is by no means impossible that the US will withdraw from NATO, meaning that it can’t veto Ukraine’s entry, but limiting the value of its worth. It is more likely that Mr Trump will seek to neutralise NATO by sitting fat, dumb and ugly inside its structure – much as the country does within the World Trade Organisation.
What if this plan doesn’t work? Russia calculates that America will stop its assistance anyway, and may not be so worried about the lifting of sanctions. And they might hope to talk Mr Trump into lifting them anyway. That may be too optimistic on Russia’s part. Mr Trump can sense when he’s being stitched up, and will walk away abruptly when he does. That is what happened in his attempt to negotiate a deal with North Korea – and this has many similarities. What happens then? My best guess is that US aid would continue, but would be renegotiated with Ukraine’s European supporters, and with Ukraine itself. The gloomier prospect is that he will walk away from the whole thing, blaming Ukraine and Europe, and ending the aid – which is the outcome Russia seeks.
This is putting the European powers in a tough position, as they at last recognise. If the war continues, they need to find an effective way of continuing to support Ukraine. This is, after all, the most cost-effective way to keep Russia at bay. If there is a ceasefire, then they need to reevaluate the Russian threat, in the knowledge that American support will be limited at best.
Much has been made of America giving away part of its negotiating position in advance. But there are many ways to negotiate and you shouldn’t listen to so-called experts on this. In negotiating terms The American government has put the ball in the Russian court. The Russians will be expected to move from their own hardline negotiating position in order to give proceedings a start – though they are unlikely to do this in public. An immediate ceasefire will be the critical point, though, and I doubt that they will concede this early.
Donald Trump is not a great negotiator on the international scene – but he isn’t a dummy either. A ceasefire and frozen conflict is not the best outcome, but it would be an improvement on what is happening now. No better outcome is available for the time being. We must hope that Mr Trump has the patience to secure it.
And here’s the update, posted today, 23 February
How are the Ukraine negotiations going?
Not well, but there is hope
I posted last week on President Donald Trump’s negotiations to end the Ukraine war. I said that they would revolve around three things – a ceasefire, ending US aid to Ukraine, and lifting sanctions on Russia. There would be no long-term resolution of the dispute, which would be kicked into the long grass. How is it looking?
The Americans say that they are seeking a long-term resolution, rather than my rather short-term analysis. My prediction is that they will find this hard going. Russia is offering its own version of a long term resolution, but this will prove unacceptable to the Ukrainian government, even under extreme duress. Moving Russia from its solution will be just as hard.
The remarkable thing about events so far is that there seems to have been little negotiation at all. Mr Trump has spoken to the Russian and Ukrainian presidents; Russian and American officials have met in Saudi Arabia; the Americans have tried to strong-arm Ukraine in giving up mineral rights to the US in return for nothing – supposedly to recoup past American aid. Following the first of these Mr Trump has parroted Russian talking points, such as the war being Ukraine’s fault, and that President Volodymyr Zelensky’s mandate has expired, on top of his flat rejection of most ofUkraine’s war aims (starting with the reclamation of lost territory). After the talks in Saudi, American officials gushed about the business opportunities available in Russia for American businesses. But Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, did not offer a date for a meeting between the Mr Trump and Vladimir Putin, the Russian president; he said this would be done once the Russians proved that they were serious. In other words the Russians hadn’t shown they were serious yet. I take this to mean that they haven’t offered a ceasefire. Mr Trump then backtracked on some of his remarks, and appeared to be showing the Ukrainians slightly more respect.
The Russians are cock-a-hoop. Their plan is to get America to stop its aid and lift sanctions, without giving away a ceasefire, and then to force Ukraine into a humiliating defeat. Ukraine would be seriously hobbled if it lost access to the US Starlink system and to American Patriot missiles, if nothing else. They think things are going their way, because the Americans, and Mr Trump in particular, seem to be conceding all their negotiating points without a fight. This is surely too optimistic on their part.
What to make of the American attempt to bully Ukraine into conceding mineral rights? The curious thing about this is that it would give America a stake in a continuing Ukraine – especially since many of the minerals in question are in the Russian-occupied zone. Those rights would not be secure if Russia got its way in Ukraine – it would violate Russia’s sphere of influence. It is for this reason that Mr Zelensky may give ground on this. It would also be pretty useless without a ceasefire.
The Russians are not responding to Mr Trump’s negotiating tactics, which seem to a sort of tennis strategy – I make a concession and then it’s your turn. They are going to have to try putting real pressure on Russia for them to offer a ceasefire. I’m not sure that has dawned on Mr Trump yet. But it must have on some of his advisers – even if others (including the Vice President J D Vance perhaps) would happily cut Ukraine off and walk away.
What has become crystal clear, though, is that Mr Trump has no idea what the war is about. He seems to think that it was a stupid misunderstanding that got out of hand. He hasn’t grasped that for Russia the war is about incorporating Ukraine into its polity and suppressing Ukrainian nationalism – and for Ukrainians it is a desperate fight to stop this from happening. It is all much more serious that he appears to think. And it’s all much harder than he thought to stop it.
I’m clinging to the hope that Mr Trump will realise that he is being stitched up by the Russians and start getting tough. And I’m sticking to my original prediction.
I agree with this post that Putin’s aim is the subjugation of Ukraine. More-over, I doubt whether he is in a position to compromise on the essentials of this aim, because to him a free Ukraine – within whatever cease-fire boarders might be reasonably envisaged – would be a threat to the stability of Russia, due to Russians wanting to emulate Ukrainian freedom and living standards. So I am not expecting Putin to agree a cease-fire deal without very major concessions from the US; and so, from this posts conclusion that a ceasefire comes first, it follows that the Trump initiative is unlikely to yield positive short-term results.
What then? If really alarmed, could not European countries afford to buy the necessary inputs, including the likes to Patriot missile systems, on the world market for weapons? These days, by all accounts, defence has an advantage over attack in Ukrainian conditions, and drones have an advantage over both infantry and tanks. Might this not give the Ukrainians and European countries the means to start winning if forced into a long war? It is noticeable that Russia has found no way of delivering a knockout blow, not even from its attacks over the winter on Ukrainian power supplies.
Interesting. Yes I think Europe doesn’t have to copy America’s version of deterrence to be effective. It is not necessary to depend on extremely expensive levels of equipment – and it will take time for Russia to rebuild. Still I think Europe needs to ramp up its supplies of munitions – and access to non-American sources such as South Korea.