It is now six months since Russia launched its full-sale war against Ukraine, though hostilities started all the way back in 2014, with the seizure of Crimea. Not much changes day to day on the ground, and it is hard to tell if either side has an advantage. All the talk is of a long war and stalemate. It looks as if this is now Russia’s strategy. Will it work?
I last commented on the war in July. I mentioned then that my two main sources were The Economist and the Institute for the Study of War. The former is by far the better for getting an overall perspective. In the last print edition it had three interesting articles, on Ukraine’s prospective counteroffensive in the south, on life in occupied Ukraine, and a more general one on urban warfare. As somebody who can’t quite let go of his boyish enthusiasm for for military things (I still play with model soldiers), I find its coverage of military thinking of interest. It is, of course, very journalistic. It reports a number of points of view without being clear about the conclusion. In previous blogs I have expressed my frustration with its frequent repetition of the “conventional wisdom” that attackers need a three-to-one numerical superiority. It is clear that this piece of nonsense is actually quite embedded amongst western military theorists. This is a demonstration that the money-machine of the defence industry has a large bullshit factory attached. I shouldn’t have been surprised. All that can be said is that things look even worse in Russia, but at least Ukraine has demonstrated a capacity for intelligent pragmatism in military matters. That is doubtless a reflection of the extreme pressure they are under. They can’t afford bullshit.
ISW provides a bit more detail around the edges, but its quality has fallen off. It has a strong pro-Ukrainian bias. I mentioned in my last article that it nevertheless reported interesting colour from Russian “milbloggers” – commentators with military connections that were often critical of the Russian military leadership, though not of the war itself. Alas this source is a lot less interesting these days. The Russian government seems to be curbing it.
What do I learn from these sources? Well, not very much seems to be happening on the ground at all. Russian attacks in Donbas are slowing down, now that the more obvious targets, such as Severodonetsk have fallen. They are shifting strength to the south, in anticipation of a Ukrainian counteroffensive there. This counteroffensive has been talked up for the last couple of months or so, but not much seems to be happening on the ground, beyond an intensifying artillery battle, with Ukraine using its new advanced munitions to attack Russian logistics. The Economist is suggesting that the whole thing might be a feint. They don’t think the Ukrainians are ready yet. It is hard to tell how much of this assessment is based on hard reality, and how much is from the same western bullshit factory that thought the Russians were going to secure a rapid victory, and who keep talking about the need for a 3 to 1 numerical superiority for an attacker. The critical factor is the morale of Russian forces – which seems to be weak, since they depend so much on hastily raised and poorly trained and led units. These are the raw materials of a spectacular military disaster. On the other hand, plentiful Russian artillery presents a major problem for the attackers. And the Ukrainian military would be right to be wary of sending in inadequately trained forces. They can’t repeat Russian tactics.
With the situation on the ground moving to stalemate, more emphasis is going on symbolic and propaganda attacks. Ukraine’s attacks on Crimea look to be such, the area having been considered safe enough for Russians to use as a holiday resort. and so do occasional Russian long-range attacks on targets in Ukraine’s interior.
Meanwhile the Russian leadership thinks time is on its side. It’s not hard to see why. Ukraine is becoming more dependent on advanced western equipment and munitions, but these are expensive and supply capacity is constrained. Meanwhile the economic war with the West seems to be going quite well for Russia. Its economy is bearing up to sanctions better than expected. Meanwhile high energy prices are causing a major economic crisis in both Europe and, to a lesser extent, in America. There are signs of stress in the West’s political pro-war political coalition. The far right look as if it will come out on top in Italy; Emmanuel Macron has lost his parliamentary majority; Donald Trump looks ascendant in the US. Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, has a low opinion of the moral fibre of the West. He surely thinks that Western resolve will collapse.
But that is to underestimate the strength of the West – a bit like the many Brexiteers thought the European Union was on the verge of collapse. It is hard to appreciate the strength of something you despise. Germany is the bulwark. Britain has found it politically convenient to back Ukraine’s war, and that will not change, even as it changes prime minister. Donald Trump is two years away from re-entering the White House – and his campaign may well collapse before then. Germany had staked a lot on a cosy commercial relationship with Russia, and access to its gas. Russia has betrayed the trust Germans placed in it, and the country understands that there is no going back. And so before our eyes that country s accomplishing a major economic realignment. The cost is enormous but the country is ready for it.
And meanwhile Russia has weaknesses of its own. Its army was never as effective as many thought, and now it is short of trained manpower and leadership. The problem will take years to fix. The government may have the political will, but it lacks the technical competence. Mr Putin has developed a highly effective internal security apparatus and propaganda machine, but beyond that Russia is being hollowed out.
So where does it end? The world is getting another lesson in how modern wars are easy to start and hard to end. As the war goes on, the stakes rise. What starts as a matter of geopolitical manoeuvre is sold as a clash of civilisations. In the early part of the war (or this phase of it), I speculated on what sort of a settlement might result. Such a settlement, with territorial losses to Ukraine, may come about if American patience is exhausted, and it forces Ukraine’s hand. That looks a long way off. The rise of Mr Trump, and President Joe Biden’s weakness, ironically, makes such an end less likely. Mr Biden can’t afford another embarrassing retreat after Afghanistan. Otherwise it will take regime change in Russia to end the war. It is hard to tell what might precipitate that. Mr Putin looks as secure as ever.
So the world has to endure yet another lesson in the futility of war.
” [Russia’s] economy is bearing up to sanctions better than expected.”
But why did we expect any different?
We, in the UK, are reliant on international trade to provide us with enough food, energy, minerals etc to keep our economy functioning. If we were ever subject to sanctions we’d be in real trouble. Russia is not like the UK. It is self sufficient in nearly all natural resources.
There may be some temporary problem if access to high tech western components is restricted, but the Russians have the capability to either replace them with home produced products or trade with the Chinese, and others, who are going to be happy to help them out.
Economies are really about the allocation of resources, goods, and services rather than money. The Russians don’t need dollars, pounds or euros as we are only now finding out!
There’s quite a sober assessment of this in this week’s Economist. There are some high tech components that even China can’t help Russia with, and sanctions dodging only offers a limited answer. But more a recipe for long term stagnation rather than disaster. I think the dollar economy was more important to Russia’s emerging middle class – but Putin sees these as a political threat, so he’s not too bothered about them. That’s causing a bit of a brain drain – another factor pointing to stagnation.
The Economist asks the question of “Are sanctions on Russia working?”. A short answer would be ‘not really’! We are suffering from Russian sanctions too and the reality is that both sides will, over the course of a year or so, adjust their economies to the new realities.
The war will drag on but it won’t be decided by sanctions.
If the brain drain becomes excessive the Putin government will restrict travel and emigration as did the Soviet Union. There’s no easy answer. The only way I can see the conflict ending is if neither side thinks it can win outright and new borders of Ukraine are mutually agreed and enforced with initial UN involvement.
I notice that, in true Lib Dem style, you use Brexit in your argument. But “Germany is the bulwark”? Of what? The EU or the western response to Russian aggression? I can’t see how that sentence applies to either.
European countries, whether inside or outside of the EU, would rightly have never allowed themselves to become quite so dependent on any 3rd country for their food supply, so why have a different attitude when it comes to energy? This has been a huge blunder on the part of Germany. France has been far more sensible with its long standing development of nuclear power.
The EU is sensibly keeping a low profile at the moment but previously it has expanded eastwards at every opportunity. This shouldn’t be seen as an excuse, but it gives Russian nationalists what they see as an excuse if not a reason for their invasion of Ukraine. The EU has been quite reckless in ignoring the geopolitical implications of its expansionary ambitions.
I’m afraid I’m going to keep coming back to Brexit. That said, I admit there is quite a bit of nonsense out there in the Brexit blame game.
Germany committed a colossal strategic error in its assessment of Russia. Its Ostpolitik was one of the factors that brought about the collapse of communism. They seem to have thought that economic and other engagement would bring Russia round to be another an essentially cooperative power – on the basis of that being in its economic interest. That may have been behind the EU’s “reckless” expansion eastwards. In fact this was strongly in the interests of the EU countries, not least Germany – by bringing in East Europe’s labour market. This has been an enormous boost to the EU economies – and actually of huge benefit to the new members too. While this clearly may have upset Russian nationalists, the EU has been careful to try and limit the persecution and discrimination against Russian-speakers in the Baltic states. It saw itself as pushing forwards civilised standards of behaviour. This was certainly assertive – and can be held against the usual claim that the EU can’t do foreign policy.
But my view is that Germany now feels betrayed, as is set on a path of disengagement with Russia. That will involve a lot of wrenching change and major costs. Because Germany is prepared to pay those costs, I think the rest of Europe will follow it. This contrasts to Britain’s stance which has been essentially opportunist, and has little impact on other countries. Without Germany, Western and European resistance to Russia would eventually collapse – which is why it is the bulwark. Its political resolution is the key. I think British commentators (and indeed Russian policymakers) have failed to understand the significance of what is happening there. The Greens are critical to this pivot – of course they see the long term benefits of lessening the dependence on gas.