What we expected was grief

Obelisk at Southport (2013) Picture by Rept0n1x

“What did you expect? Britain’s protests reflect DECADES of elite failure.” Thus starts a Substack post by populist commentator Matt Goodwin. This was in the aftermath of a violent attack on a mosque in Southport which in turn followed an appalling stabbing in that town, when three little girls were murdered, and several others injured.

What we expected, Mr Goodwin, was that the victims would be given due respect, and that their friends and neighbours be given the space to come to terms with the horror of what occurred. And we expected that time would be given for the facts of the incident to be established, and for lessons to be drawn from those facts. We expected common human decency. We did not expect the community’s grief to be hijacked by outsiders to promote their particular frustrations and grievances. At least the riot gave the community a chance to show their real mettle by turning up to help clean up the mess afterwards, and offer the mosque’s congregation messages of support. But, alas, further riots have taken place in other towns, well and truly hijacking a proper response to the tragedy – though at least these are leaving the town of Southport alone.

Mr Goodwin’s diatribe is worth reading for any of those wanting to get a better understanding of the undercurrents in British political life. It’s a powerful polemic and, apart from being too long and a bit repetitive (making it hard to re-read), it is well-written. The idea is to make people angry, and not to put forward a coherent argument in a process of debate. But Mr Goodwin is an academic, and a coherent argument does lie behind it, and, though there is a lot of insinuation, it is reasonably factual (though taking facts out of context is very much his method) – unlike much of what gets written in this space. It is worth trying to understand it, and drawing out where it is right, where it is wrong and where it is hard to know. That’s what I want to do here.

Mr Goodwin’s argument is that the riot stemmed from a protest by “ordinary people” fed up with the effects of mass immigration, which is disrupting society and making it less safe. The critical fact about the murders, so far as Mr Goodwin is concerned, is that the the arrested suspect is the son of a Rwandan immigrant, allowing blame to be put at the door of immigration policy. Mr Goodwin’s ire is directed at policies, including “unrestricted” immigration, being practiced for “decades” by a liberal governing elite, taking in all the main political parties (apart from Reform UK and its predecessor, Ukip), the mainstream media, and government agencies. These liberal policies are excessively indulgent to minorities, he suggests, and do not take account of the impacts on “ordinary people”, who feel they didn’t consent to them, and don’t recognise their country any more, after decades of change. I could go on – Mr Goodwin is especially vitriolic about the Labour Party and left-wing academics, of which he doubtless has a lot of direct personal experience. Notwithstanding the complaint that these voices of complaint are unheard, readers will doubtless be very familiar with what is being said. Indeed these views have been expressed by Conservative politicians, such as Suella Braverman. They are frequently heard, though rarely endorsed, on mainstream media, and especially the BBC. Mr Goodwin does unequivocally say that attacking the police is always wrong, and in a later Substack post, he condemns all the violence as simply damaging the communities in whose name the complaints are being made. But he also complains of double standards over how the police and politicians handle these protests compared to those made on behalf of Palestinians, say – or counter demonstrators, often by Muslim men, which in some cases have been violent too. His critical argument is that the protests should not simply be dismissed as being the work of “far-right” activists, and it isn’t just a matter of misinformation and disinformation. It is a symptom of millions of people being utterly fed up.

So, where do I think Mr Goodwin is right? Firstly, that alongside the violence, is a voice of protest that is a reflection of many people’s views. Mr Goodwin suggests that these are drawn from a majority of “ordinary people”. That’s a stretch – but his alternative characterisation of “millions” is surely on the money. Many people would hear what Mr Goodwin has to say, and thank him for expressing their views faithfully. It’s a lot of people, and they feel ignored or betrayed by the political class. The Conservatives under Boris Johnson courted such people in the 2019 election, and won over many of their votes on the basis of promises to limit migration and “level up” left-behind places. A vision was painted of a high-productivity country, with higher wages, which did not depend on immigrants, especially lower-paid ones (I’m not comfortable with the usual formulation of “lower-skilled”). But this was a have-your-cake and eat it vision, typical of Mr Johnson, that did not acknowledge the difficulties in reaching such a promised land, and the costs. Those costs are skill shortages in industries such as healthcare, social care, agriculture and hospitality, to name only the most obvious. These skill shortages lead to higher wages, which was exactly the intention, of course. But these, initially at least, lead to inflation. It’s not possible to pay for the higher wages through higher productivity in the short-term, and often higher productivity actually occurs in industries that are not directly affected by the skills shortages, meaning that things have to be rebalanced. Inflation is inevitable, even if is part of a temporary process of readjustment in the economy. Higher inflation means higher interest rates and more expensive mortgages. Mr Johnson’s government was not ready for this, and in any case was blown off course by the Covid crisis, followed by the Ukraine war and the rising costs of fossil fuels. After he went, as the chaos and low-level corruption of his government became too much, the Conservatives changed tack. They became passionate opponents of inflation, and obsessed with cutting taxes. That meant taking a hard line on public sector salaries, and letting inflation cut the real cost of public services – which in turn led to an increased dependence on cheap imported labour. The government buckled under the pressure of labour shortages, and other pressures to revive short-term economic growth, and allowed immigration levels to continue at high levels and even to increase. It is not hard to see why so many people feel betrayed and angry. A reaction was to be expected.

The second place where I think Mr Goodwin is right is that immigration is causing real stress. The most important stress point in my view is in housing. The rise in property rents – in the region of 6% per annum since the start of 2022, according to the Office for National Statistics – and significantly higher in places like London -is causing widespread hardship. The country struggles to expand its housing stock fast enough – with dysfunctional planning controls, to say nothing of labour shortages. In this sense, the popular plea that immigration should be stopped because “we are full” has some merit. Claims on immigration’s other effects, on public services and public order, are much harder to substantiate. But the impact on housing is serious enough by itself.

I have a little sympathy with when Mr Goodwin says that a lot of policy at public agencies has been inept, and left-wing fads have been given too much headway. This is especially the case with universities, although a lot of this has been driven by student action, and the “cancelling” of speakers, often on flimsy evidence. The Tavistock Clinic’s life-changing treatments on young people with gender dysphoria leant more on fad than evidence. Looking further back in time, but still very prominent in Mr Goodwin’s list of evils, was the lack of action to combat the grooming of girls by Asian gangs in a number of towns – this had a lot to do with old-fashioned class prejudice, but it was also regarded as politically sensitive. Having observed some of controversies at Liberal Democrats conferences over the years, I get that with some people you are not allowed a proper conversation on sensitive issues.

There are number of grey zones – claims made by Mr Goodwin or his critics that are either hard to establish in fact, or where the evidence is mixed. The narrative that the unrest is all about “far-right” thuggery is pushed hard by the government, and fully supported by media such as the BBC, and criticised by Mr Goodwin. But there is clearly a lot of politically directed thuggery going on, and while I’m not comfortable with the label, I don’t have a better one than “far-right”. But there are a lot of others who come along to watch or cheer the thuggery on, including people local to the areas affected. Still, the thuggery is a serious law and order challenge, and the public expects political leaders to deal with it firmly. Anything that sounds like making excuses for people crosses an important line. This is something that Mr Goodwin seems to be finding out for himself: in his latest message, ironically titled “The British People need to feel safe,” he gives the impression of being under siege, and he appeals for more people to make subscriptions too support the promotion of his message. Here he does say unequivocally that he is against the violence – something he didn’t quite do earlier, except when the violence was directed against the police.

Another part of the grey zone is the claim that certain immigrant communities are making the country less safe. One BBC correspondent has been saying that violent crime has been falling through the period when the number of immigrants is rising. But the quality of British crime statistics is not what it was – and reported crimes depend on other factors than the number of crimes committed. And what if crime is falling because people are going out less? A lot of illegal immigration is linked to organised crime, and I would not be surprised if certain immigrant communities were linked to crime. But a lot of the right-wing tropes about no-go areas and such are nonsense. I used to live in an inner London borough, with large immigrant communities. But the danger posed to a single young woman walking home there came from a white British police officer. If I wanted to develop an idea that there was a national crime wave of violence against women perpetrated by white men, I would find it easy to produce a litany just as horrific as Mr Goodwin’s on immigrant crimes.

I’m also putting Mr Goodwin’s claim about multiculturalism in that grey zone. He promotes the common right-wing trope that multiculturalism has failed. This was not evident where I used to live – including when I was a chair of governors at a multi-ethnic primary school, where white British were in a minority. Local parents, from all communities, simply wanted their children to do well for themselves. The school adapted to the fact that so many children were from homes with English as a second language, and achieved national average performance regardless. But this isn’t always so. There are places where integration has not worked well – for example in some northern towns – and politicians seem short of ideas about how to move on.

There’s a lot more grey: claims made by Mr Goodwin where the evidence is in fact mixed, if it exists. Where do I think he is out and out wrong? One place is pinning the blame for the policies he likes on a tiny elite (sometimes widened to an “elite class”) imposing policies on an unwilling majority. That governing elite has a hinterland of people that largely share their values, even if they disagree with policy specifics, that runs into millions of people. This is after all how the politicians get elected. They include many people like me, who feel just as unable to shape public policy as people throwing bricks at police in Rotherham, and who don’t take well to be called a governing elite. Describing the political class as an elite has its sinister aspects too. Often this language is used by people who want to gain power and plant their own governing elite, which then moves on to practice self-enrichment using the state privileges. This is what happened in Hungary and Poland, for example. It is hard not to see Donald Trump’s entourage in that light. The striking thing about the liberal elites in Britain and elsewhere is how honest they are. It’s a question of being careful what you wish for.

A further place where Mr Goodwin is clearly wrong is blaming public policy on the elite’s “luxury beliefs” though I don’t think he uses that phrase in “What did you expect?”. There is a reason that public policy has taken the direction it has in the last couple of decades or so, including mass migration, and it is not a dilettante governing elite imposing its luxury beliefs. It’s because the country faced serious challenges, and this seemed to be the easiest way to meet them. I have already described how Mr Johnson’s government fell apart because of the impossibility of the vision he promoted. The is not to say that a low-immigration economic model is infeasible for Britain, or even undesirable. It is just a lot harder to get there than the idea’s supporters claim. Brexit is another example of a policy that was promoted without making clear what the full implications were. There was a case for Brexit, but one that involved a difficult transition that was glossed over or disbelieved by its supporters. And now our politicians are trying to promote the idea that the main tax rates can be left unchanged while public services are repaired. And so the government is kicking a response to crisis on social care into the long grass in order to preserve tax rates. It is fair to accuse our politicians of not being honest about the choices the country must make. But, I’m afraid the electing public are deeply complicit with that. If anything the luxury beliefs are the ideas that low immigration and post-Brexit prosperity can be acheived easily.

And finally there is the issue of culture. Mr Goodwin wants to suggest that there is a British culture that is being undermined by mass immigration, and foreign beliefs imposed by the elites. But culture is a moving target. Not so long ago pregnant women would commit suicide rather than endure the disgrace of being a single mother. Even more recently being gay was considered by most to be a disgusting perversion. Pretty much the whole of society has moved on. And our culture has always been part and parcel of a worldwide cultural melange. And it wasn’t all that long ago when British commercial emissaries, armed forces and religious missionaries went out into that wider world to export and impose our culture on the developing world – the era of Empire. Indeed I think Mr Goodwin wants us to be proud of that empire. But that history leaves us very open to importing cultures from elsewhere, through immigration amongst other ways – from our former empire, and from Europe, to which our history is so closely bound. Our country cannot live in isolation – we cannot escape treaties, international conventions and obligations, as there is no such thing as absolute national sovereignty. And by taking a fuller role in the wider world, we can make it a better place, by ensuring European security, or saving the world from global warming, for example. By trying to pretend that things can be otherwise, Mr Goodwin is simply stirring up trouble for no positive end.

There is much that is wrong with Britain. Class prejudice remains – and I think that lies behind much of what Mr Goodwin complains of. So does racism and misogyny. Drug addition and unhealthy lifestyles are rampant. Too many young people are drawn into violent gangs. There is too much sub-standard housing. And too many of these things are not being confronted by the political class – or the public that votes them into office. Mr Goodwin did the country a service after the Brexit referendum, when he tried to illuminate how many of our fellow countrymen felt. But he has gone way beyond that, as he is promotes a destructive political agenda, fuelled by false ideas. By trying to exploit the grief of Southport, or at least excuse those that are, he has sunk to a new low.

When will the Tory rot stop?

More from MS Image Creator. I’m getting bored of the “realistic” style so tried a cartoon instead

So just how wrong have I been about the UK general election? My first prediction was that there would be a limit to the Conservative decline (at about 100 seats), and that there was no chance that the Liberal Democrats would overtake them. The Reform UK insurgents would be unable to replace the Tories. In my second post I suggested that the Conservatives would narrow the gap on Labour by squeezing Reform, limiting the overall size of their loss.

The second prediction is not faring well. I was wrong-footed by Reform’s leader, Nigel Farage, changing his mind about standing himself, and being the formal party leader. His initial declaration got Reform off to a bad start, and offered the Tories an opportunity. But the Tories made a weak start, and Mr Farage is back, attracting media like bees to a honeypot, including the supposedly establishment-biased BBC. The Conservative attempt to squeeze Reform supporters has stalled, at least at the national level, and even gone into reverse. More than one MRP poll now suggests that Reform might even pick up a handful of seats.

But I’m holding fast to my first prediction. There is quite a lot of breathless talk about the Tories being crushed, with well under 100 seats retained. One or two MRP polls suggest that they will indeed by eclipsed by the Lib Dems. Reform cheerleader Matt Goodwin, whose Substack is one of my main sources of information on the populist right, is talking of an inflection point, with Reform overtaking and crushing the Conservatives. Even the Financial Times‘s Stephen Bush finds himself dealing with the speculation that the Lib Dems might overtake the Conservatives in terms of seats won – though he still considers this unlikely.

My logic is rather different from that of other commentators, though. It is that the actual results in many constituencies are determined by the activity of local activists on the ground – canvassing, leaflet delivery, posters and such, often referred to as “the ground war”, as opposed to the “air war” of media. The ground war helps voters decide who is really in contention in their seat, and then to decide on the least-worst option. This is more likely to change minds than anything that happens in the air war, that attracts most of the attention. I am a case in point. I have voted for the Lib Dems or their predecessors in every general election from 1983 (my first vote, in 1979, was for the Conservatives). The only thing that could possibly persuade me otherwise this time is if I thought my local Green candidate was in serious contention in my constituency of East Grinstead and Uckfield – she is my local councillor, and the only one of the candidates I know – and whom I’m quite impressed with. She claims that this is the case based on local election results; but the Lib Dem candidate makes the same claim based on 2019 election results (complicated by the fact it is a new seat); meanwhile the tactical voting recommendation from Best for Britain is for Labour, based on an MRP poll. It’s as clear as mud, though I think the Labour claim to be ridiculous. The Tory candidate (Mims Davies, the MP for the now-defunct Mid-Sussex constituency) has not given up, and has been canvassing in our village, in the extreme south of the constituency. She will surely have quite an easy ride back into parliament, even if she fails to get 40% of the vote, which is likely.

The Conservatives lack opponents with a proper ground-war capability in so many of their well-off rural strongholds. Labour have never been strong in these seats; the Lib Dem infrastructure is only there for some seats (locally to me in Lewes and Tunbridge Wells, for example), and the Greens in even fewer (the non-rural Brighton Pavilion in my area). Reform is not constructed as a grassroots organisation, and will struggle without a charismatic candidate and an experienced local organiser – which applies in a maximum of three or four seats, I suspect. The MRP poll methodology only picks up the ground war factor indirectly and underplays it. This makes its constituency predictions unreliable in each individual case, though more plausible in aggregate, which is how their success is usually judged. My guess is that the unique conditions of this campaign mean that their aggregate conclusions are out too in most cases – and that the Conservatives will do better than forecast. Though to be fair, there is quite a bit of variation in the MRP seat projections. The ground war factor mean that it is unlikely for the Lib Dems to pass the 50 seat mark, or the Greens 3.

Furthermore, I think Mr Goodwin is running well ahead of the evidence in his claims about Reform. So far I think only one poll, by YouGov, has placed them ahead of the Tories, and that was a week ago. Aggregated poll trackers tend to put them several points behind. Mr Farage’s volte-face gave the party a boost but it doesn’t look like sustained momentum. They may pick up a lot votes in areas where the ground war is weak, such as in safe Labour seats, which might lead them to widespread second places, but little impact on the overall result (a bit like the SDP-Liberal Alliance in 1983 and 1987, and the Lib Dems in 1992 – though in their case it was mainly safe Conservative seats where they did well).

Having criticised recent MRP polls, though, the overall result predicted by Ipsos-Mori (Labour 453, Conservatives 115, Lib Dem 38) is not far from where I think things will end up – though the individual constituency projections are wayward – giving Labour far too big a share in Lib Dem target seats, for example). MRPs are a poor way to guide for tactical voting decisions. The Tories may do a bit better than this, and Labour worse. I hope the Lib Dems will do a bit better too, but then my hopes have run ahead of the actuality for every election since 1983, apart from 1997.

So, to answer the question posed by my blog title, I expect the Tory rot to stop soon, with their ground war strengths serving to limit the damage. What happens next is the big question – but let’s wait until after the election to consider that.

Postscript

Just after I posted this, three new MRPs came out – and Matt Goodwin breathlessly reported a new poll showing a spectacular surge in Reform support to 24%, with the Conservatives languishing on 15%. This poll was conducted by Mr Goodwin’s own organisation, People Polling, for GB News, another Reform promoter. This is curious. Mr Goodwin is an academic and I have no reason to doubt his professionalism in conducting polls. But it is an outlier. It is clearly becoming harder to conduct opinion polls, and a lot of the result depends on how adjustments to the raw results are made. There is always a lot of soul-searching after elections amongst pollsters, which then leaves the impression that they are refighting the last war rather trying the win the current one. Mr Goodwin says that the key change is that a lot of the previous “don’t knows” are making up their minds, and that Reform are doing very well here and the Tories very badly. There is other evidence for the second of these contentions (though that suggested Labour doing well) – a disaster for Rishi Sunak, whose whole campaign was based on the idea that he could rally “don’t knows” who had previously voted Tory.

I don’t think the new MRPs add anything to my analysis, though I haven’t looked at them closely. They show the Tories coming in at roughly 50, 100 and 150 seats. My opinion is that the higher end of the range is the most realistic forecast. I think generally that the MRPs are over-reporting Labour strength in seats that the party isn’t targeting – probably to the benefit of the Tories, but maybe the Lib Dems too.

20 June 2024

Britain does not need a new conservative party

How the Tory party looks to some… More from MicroSoft Image Creator

In the local elections this month the Conservatives did very badly. Their leader’s attempt to suggest that they pointed to a hung parliament is delusional. I have heard the suggestion that they may do so badly at the next election that the Liberal Democrats will form the official opposition. The example of the Conservatives’ Canadian sister party in 1993 is quoted – they slumped from being governing party to just two parliamentary seats. The vultures are starting to circle, with at least two people (Matt Goodwin and Dominic Cummings) suggesting that a replacement party be built to cater for conservative voters, alongside the rising ambitions of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK. But that is folly.

First of all, I think the Conservatives are heading for a rout in the next general election – and probably their worst ever result. Some people simply can’t believe that such a reversal of the 2019 landslide is feasible; others suggest that the polls always narrow as an election approaches. Party managers at the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats are both (rightly) anxious to suppress complacency amongst their campaigners, and are happy to promote such talk. But this is driving through the rear view mirror, and reminds me of the sort of things some Lib Dems were saying before their polling disaster in 2015. History does help us judge the future, but you should never be slave to it. The Conservatives are in a unique predicament, and show now signs of understanding a way out.

But we can dismiss talk of the Lib Dems getting more seats than the Conservatives. They did manage to win more council seats at the local elections, which was quite a feat when the councils in contention weren’t particularly advantageous to the party (unlike last year). But that’s council seats: as you go higher up the election size, the Lib Dems rapidly disappear. The Conservatives won 19 out of 33 Police and Crime Commissioners in England; Labour won the other 14, and three more in Wales, where Plaid Cymru won one. The Lib Dems were nowhere in sight. Neither was the party in contention in any of the 11 regional mayoral elections (10 to Labour, one to the Tories). This shows that there remains a massive bedrock of Tory support in rural areas, which the Lib Dems (and Greens for that matter) can only tackle in a very localised way; the Labour vote is also very patchy here. Even when the Tories are doing very badly, the anti-Tory vote is very fragmented. In order to win one of the other parties has to convince the voters that the other potential challengers aren’t in serious contention; not only is that a hard case to make in many places, but they don’t have the campaigning strength to get that message across in these often massive constituencies. There will be no electoral pacts involving Labour – and if there is one between Greens and Lib Dems (there is no such talk that I’m aware of – although this did happen in 2019) it will be very limited in scope. The Lib Dems are focusing their campaigning efforts on a relatively small number of constituencies, although exactly how many is always under review. This number is not likely to be more than 40 seats; when they targeted much more than this in 2019, the result was disaster. The polls, and the local results, show that the party has no general groundswell of support, and it will only succeed in places where it has campaigning strength. The Greens may have more of a general groundswell of support, but their campaigning strength is much weaker. If they spread their efforts over more than half a dozen seats they will be seriously wasting resources; they are in serious contention in about three at the most – one of which (Brighton Pavilion – their only existing seat) they might well lose to Labour, after the retirement of the popular Jean Lucas. The insurgent right is at this stage only represented by Reform UK, which has little grassroots organisation, and is unlikely to present a serious threat in the Conservatives’ rural strongholds either – though their presence seems to terrify many Tories. The party should secure at least 100 seats even on a very bad night – and easily enough to surpass the Lib Dems’ practical maximum of 50.

The more interesting question is what happens after the election, and whether one of the right-wing insurgents can supplant the Conservatives, now much reduced in parliament. The obvious challenger is Reform UK, which is regularly polling third in national polls, and can even surpass the Tories in some demographics. But it is hard to take this party seriously as more than a nuisance. It is constituted as a limited company, under the legal control of a tight clique, led by Mr Farage. Unlike other political parties, there is no attempt to give grassroots supporters any kind of serious say. This limits any development of a serious grassroots organisation. This might work if Mr Farage could muster the sort of charisma and wealth that Donald Trump does in America. But he is not in that class, even if he is quite successful in drawing attention so himself: at one point it was hard to keep him off the BBC. And he isn’t a team player – indeed right-wing insurgency is not a team sport.

It is also hard to take Mr Cummings seriously. He masterminded the successful Vote Leave campaign in the EU referendum, one of the outstanding political achievements in recent British political history; one feature of this campaign, incidentally, was the sidelining of Mr Farage. He actually cares about making things work and designing coherent policy, rather than just grandstanding on the latest political fad. But he is tarnished by his association with Boris Johnson, for whom he was a senior adviser, though eventually falling victim to the chaos that afflicted the Johnson regime. His lack of political skill was evident – and especially his combative style of doing business. It is hard to imagine that he could put together a successful political party.

Matt Goodwin, whose name repeatedly comes up on these pages, is altogether more interesting. He is not the damaged goods that both Mr Farage and Mr Cummings are. He also applies an academic’s discipline to his thought and research. He runs regular polls and focus groups to give him a good understanding of potential supporters and resonant messages. This, apparently, has enabled him to find financial backers, and he is increasingly open over his plans to build a new political movement. His organising theme is his anger at political elites, whom he accuses of trying to impose their liberal values onto a majority of people, who don’t share them. In policy terms his main focus is on excessive immigration, but he also turns his ire onto multiculturalism, wokism and Islamic minorities. As an academic, he lives and works amongst these liberal types, and is very familiar with their complacency and limited vision (“luxury beliefs”) – and his academic research shows how much this is at odds with what the public at large thinks. He further points out that support for liberal policies tends to be in metropolitan areas, and concentrated in an electorally inefficient way. He thinks that this adds up to a political opportunity for a new conservative movement – citing Mr Johnson’s landslide in 2019 as proof that conservative voters form a substantial electoral majority. But that government, he says, was taken over by the liberal elites, and betrayed its voters, for example by opening the floodgates to immigration.

But life is hard for insurgent parties in British politics. It is commonplace to condemn the complacency and out-of-touchness of the existing political parties, and to say that there is an opportunity for a new movement – only for the whole thing to fizzle. None has succeeded since the rise of Labour more than a century ago – and that took a world war. There are three big challenges in particular: first is assembling a winning coalition of support; second is campaigning infrastructure; and third is developing a coherent policy programme.

I have talked about electoral coalitions before – with my image of a kaleidoscope. It’s all very well finding majorities to agree to particular polling questions on immigration, say, but political success means holding together disparate groups. It is not nearly enough to find disaffected voters with lower educational qualifications in the ex-industrial heartlands of North England, the Midlands and Wales. Mr Johnson succeeded because he managed to add these to more liberal metropolitan types wanting to end the Brexit chaos and assuaged by his greenery, and to the retired mass-affluent traditional Tories in the wealthier areas, and so on. This required a combination of political skill and charisma. I don’t see any of the putative Tory rivals providing this.

Then there is campaigning infrastructure. It is just about possible for a small but focused organisation to find 600 parliamentary candidates and get them nominated at election time. Rightwing insurgents have an advantage in that there are likely to be plenty of volunteers, but less so in that they are likely to be a fissiparous and ill-disciplined bunch – one reason for reform UK’s highly centralised power structure (which followed the chaos of Ukip, Mr Farage’s previous vehicle). Creating an organisation able to carry out campaigning – such as door-knocking and leafleting – in a wide enough number of seats is daunting. Campaigners imagine that they can make up for grassroots weakness with canny social media and publicity strategies, but that is an uphill fight against established parties who have the local organisation. The nearest any new movement that has come to succeeding here was the SDP in 1981 (which I was part of) – but this allied with an existing party (the Liberals), used many experienced politicians, and attracted higher-skilled liberal types with strong organisational competence. Current conservative insurgents lack these advantages, unless they can secure mass defections from the Tories, and then ally with it. And the SDP ultimately failed in its aim of replacing the Labour Party in spite of impressive polling numbers in its early days.

And then there is a coherent policy programme. In a political culture that seems to value winning elections (or referendums) more than governing or implementing viable political programmes, this might seem superfluous. Mr Johnson did not have it in 2019, and neither did Donald Trump in 2016 – and he still doesn’t. But you can’t succeed in government without it, unless you resort to repression and corruption. If electoral success depends on building a disparate coalition, unless they unite around a viable programme, this coalition cannot hold – and such a programme offers credibility. Mr Goodwin talks of the Tory government of 2019 betraying its voters – but that was always going to happen as it promised so many incompatible things. A central theme was cutting immigration to move towards an economy where lower skilled wages weren’t being undermined, and so creating a more equal society. But higher wages for less skilled people (and this did start to happen in the early days of the government) leads to inflation and puts pressure on public services, major employers of lower-paid people. That puts pressure on interest rates (and hence mortgage costs), and taxes and public services. The government was simply not ready for this dilemma, which meant betraying other parts of the coalition, and quickly buckled on immigration policy. I don’t actually think that Mr Johnson’s idea on low immigration was necessarily a bad one – but it needed to have coherent planning behind it, and answers to the resulting dilemmas. Mr Goodwin’s policy ideas seem to be similarly based on focus groups and polls, and not on any serious understanding of the practical trade-offs.

Even a charismatic and well-funded person such as Donald Trump, with considerable, if unconventional political skills, chose to co-opt the established Republican Party rather than set up in parallel with it. The conservative insurgents have no such leader, and even if a new party has strong initial success, it surely cannot succeed in the longer run in competition with the existing Conservative Party. They would only serve to offer a lifeline to a new Labour government, who might well find themselves struggling rather quickly.

It is much more viable for conservatives to bend the Conservative Party to their liking, and to promote a comeback as spectacular as Labour’s. Mr Goodwin suggests that the rump Tory party left after an electoral rout will be too dominated by Oxbridge types from the old elite. But the grassroots are more radical, and a strong conservative agenda offers a pathway back to power. The next election may over bar the voting – but the election after that is very much in play.