National finances don’t work like household budgets. That doesn’t help Labour

Taxation and public spending is very much on the political agenda here in Britain. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, is claiming that there is a £22 billion black hole of unfunded spending commitments in the government finances, left by a Conservative government addicted to brushing problems under the carpet. There is much talk of how her Labour government might raise taxes to plug this hole and meet expectations of improvements to public services and the social safety net.

This makes it a good time to ponder the economics of all this. Public debate encourages us to think of the state’s finances in terms of a household budget: public spending must be covered by taxes, or else the national debt gets out of control, which in due course could mean throwing the country to the mercy of foreign creditors, or burden future generations. This narrative has the merit of being easy to communicate and sounding like common sense. Try telling voters that this is not how things work, and they will immediately become suspicious. The US Republicans, to my knowledge, are the only politicians to have succeeded with a different narrative: the so-called “Laffer curve”, whereby tax cuts pay for themselves through economic growth. Former British Prime Minister Liz Truss tried this out on the British public in 2022, but it went very badly. Her supporters argue that his was actually through bad luck – but most politicians now treat the idea of “unfunded” tax cuts or spending commitments as politically toxic, as well as economically unwise.

The Laffer curve is in fact just one argument against the household budget narrative – but it is not a huge departure from it. Households may borrow to invest, so states should be able to so as well. If a budget deficit leads to a future increase in revenues, or lower costs, then surely it is sustainable? Labour tried to make this case with a proposal for massive investment in clean energy infrastructure – but lost their nerve as the general election loomed. Joe Biden’s administration is actually implementing such a programme in America, but the public there are resolutely sceptical. You have to believe that the future benefits are for real – and the public is generally unbelieving. Not without reason, as the processes of accountability are weak.

A further, and well-established, argument against the household budget narrative might be called the Keynesian critique. This follows the argument originally put forward by the great economist Maynard Keynes, after stringent budgeting by governments during the Great Depression of the 1930s made things worse. If there is spare capacity in the economy – a typical feature of recessions – then it makes sense for the government to run a deficit to raise demand and employ unemployed workers, creating a virtuous circle of growth – and stopping a potential doom-loop of savings leading to reduced demand leading to further savings. Governments should use taxes and spending to help manage overall demand, to ensure that the economy runs at an efficient level of capacity. This idea is very popular on the political left, who generally assume that the economy is always working below capacity – but it is not always easy to tell if there is spare capacity. Many people thought that high unemployment in the 1970s meant that there was spare capacity then – but generous fiscal policy simply seemed to stoke inflation – “stagflation”. In fact the escalating price of oil, amongst other things, meant that the economy was in a period of transition, which caused the high levels of unemployment without a ready supply of potential new jobs. I thought something similar was happening in Britain after the great financial crisis of 2007-2009 – and that this was the justification for the 2010 coalition government’s austerity policies (which were rejected by the left with religious fervour). The pre-crash economy had been too dependent on fake gains in financial services and related business services, meaning that it wasn’t just a case of managing aggregate demand, but allowing for a degree of restructuring, which takes longer. I don’t think anybody else made that argument. Supporters of austerity used versions of the household budget narrative, while most economists said that austerity was the wrong policy because aggregate demand was weak. I still think I was right – though by 2015 the case for further austerity had largely gone, meaning that further cuts made by the Conservative government from that year were excessive.

A final critique of the household budget narrative is made most prominently by advocates of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). They point out that where countries control their own money supply (which is the case for Britain and America, though not the Eurozone), then they don’t need to worry about the national debt, because they can just create the money to fund it. This, in fact, is exactly what many governments did during the period of Quantitive Easing (QE) in the 2010s. For some reason, MMT is regarded as heterodox economics, and its advocates akin to heretics by conventional economists. I have never entirely understood this – it has always seemed to be a matter of politics rather than substance. Some MMT advocates delight in attacking orthodox economics, not always with secure logic, and this no doubt creates a backlash. Nevertheless MMT economists such as Stephanie Kelton produce well-argued work which is thought-provoking in a good way (this article in the FT gives a flavour). The central proposition is that the limiting factor for fiscal policy is inflation, not debt. While inflation in the developed world appeared dead and buried in the 2010s, MMT became popular on the left, as it suggested that large budget deficits were sustainable, supporting their argument that austerity policies were primarily “ideological”. In the 2020s, with inflation back in the picture, we don’t hear so much about MMT, though their analysis remains just as valid. My personal scepticism of MMT is that its advocates don’t tend to think enough about the difficulties of managing a small open economy, which has to manage its economic relations with other economies (and exchange rate policy in particular) – a situation that fits the British economy more than the American one.

What all these insights point to that there are two important constraints to fiscal policy rather than simply whether there is enough money: inflation and foreign debt (if we accept the MMT argument that domestic debt isn’t a problem if inflation is under control). Low inflation is central to a country’s feeling of economic wellbeing. I would suggest that maintaining the value of the currency is one of the sacred duties of the state – and governments play fast and loose with this at their peril – though most liberal economists are more relaxed about this. And foreign debt can interfere badly with a sense of national sovereignty. The reason that the recent left-wing Mexican president Manuel Lopez Obrador was so keen on limiting government expenditure was exactly that: a fear of foreign debt (and an example of how austerity is not always a matter of right wing ideology). Where governments have dormant inflation and little need for foreign debt (through a current account surplus), then budget deficits can run wild – this is the case with Japan, for example. In Britain things are considerably trickier. The country now has an inflation problem, and a long persistent current account deficit, which complicates managing the national debt. It is hard to know how much of a constraint the latter problem actually is. It hasn’t been tested to destruction since the 1970s (if you discount the Truss episode), when the government called in the IMF, though some suggest this was just political theatre. The country has had no trouble in financing itself from abroad in its own currency. The country’s dependence “on the kindness of strangers” is a popular scare story put up by officials of the Treasury and the Bank of England to keep politicians in their place. And yet, like inflation in the early 2020s, you don’t know if you’ve gone over the limit until it’s too late. It was a debt problem that did for Ms Truss’s bid for freedom, after all. That was a dislocation in the domestic debt market because of some technical issues with pension fund financing. I have oversimplified things by referring to “foreign” debt – but the presence of foreign investors affects the disciplines required across the whole market. That episode showed that management of the national debt has to be strategic – it is not a simple matter of ramping up a budget deficit and seeing what happens.

Meanwhile, I suspect that inflation in Britain remains a serious problem, in spite of the headline rate returning to 2%. In the public sector the government is no longer able to resist above-inflation payrises: you can only defy the market for so long – this is a large part of Ms Reeves’s black hole. That may ripple through to the wider labour market, as the previous government feared. Meanwhile there is enormous political pressure to reduce levels of immigration – and it isn’t just politics: high rental and property prices, in part driven by immigration, is causing serious hardship, and disappointed expectations amongst younger people. Politicians talk of encouraging a high-wage high-productivity economy, not dependent on cheap immigrant labour, and it might be that the country is in transition to just such a destination. But all economic transitions involve bumpy rides, and inflation is often part of that journey. That matters because under the country’s current economic governance, the Bank of England will not reinstitute QE, and make government debt easier to swallow, when there is a threat of inflation. And while reforming economic governance might be a good idea, in the short term it would carry a heavy risk of the destabilisation of financial markets.

So, with a clear menace of inflation, and more difficult markets for government debt, the government is likely to have to raise taxes. And here politics has created a further problem. Easily the most effective taxes are Income Tax, National Insurance and Value Added Tax. These are effective because they have a large base, meaning that small percentage increases have a big impact, and because they have the most direct impact on aggregate demand, helping the management of inflation. And yet Labour has ruled out increasing these taxes (other than through the “stealth tax” of freezing tax-free allowances). There was, in fact, a political consensus on that policy: no party is suggesting that there should be any increases – which is seen to add hardship to those already suffering from higher inflation. That leaves various flavours of capital taxes or wealth taxes. These have the political advantage of primarily affecting the better off, but they help with the national debt rather than inflation – their impact on demand is limited. And they are often evaded by people with tax advisers. That is the big problem with the idea, popular on the left, that increased state spending can be financed just by taxing the rich – such a policy would be inflationary and likely to underperform its targets.

Something has to give. The government will struggle on with continued austerity and increasing some fringe taxes, hoping for a growth bump. But growth is bound to disappoint, inflation will refuse to die, and interest rates will remain uncomfortably high. One commentator has written that it will not be until a second term that Labour will start to seriously address how the country manages the state – through some combination of higher (and doubtless reformed) taxes and reduced state ambition. If the Conservatives remain in a mess, that may become politically feasible. Up until now Sir Keir Starmer’s aim has been to secure an election victory, and to impose a more serious style of political governance. That is a start but it is not enough.